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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-4-103(a)(2009).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Quast's petition for review argued that he Commission improperly construed the
PTD statute, a question of law. (Quast prevailed at the Commission on factual questions.)

•

The standard of revie,v is correctness for statutory construction. Provo City v. Serrano,
2015 UT 32, ~9; 345 P.3d 1242, 1247.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The determinative statutes in this case are:
Utah Code §34A-2-413( l)(c)(i)-(iv)(2006):
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perfonn other work reasonably available, taking
into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
-2-
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(E) residual functional capacity.
Utah Code §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)(2006):
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

***
(iii)

the industrial accident ... is the direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This case arises from Quast's application to the Utah Labor Commission for an award

of permanent total disability benefits. R. 1-4.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Quast' s sustained a thoracic-spine injury on May 16, 2007, while she was working for

Huntsman. She initially filed for benefits in 2008, but the parties resolved that application
by stipulation. Specifically, the parties stipulated that Quast's thoracic spine surgery was
compensable. Quast developed a non-union, for which she had surgery in 2010. She filed an
application for hearing based upon this new surgery to fix the non-union, and for permanent,
total disability benefits. The assigned ALJ, Debbie Hann, awarded PTD and other benefits
to Quast. Huntsman filed a motion for review.
-3-

The Commission vacated the award, and remanded for further medical evidence, postsurgery in 2010. Further evidence was taken, and a new ALJ, Deidre Marlow was assigned.
Judge Marlowe concluded that the stipulation of the parties that the first thoracic spine
surgery was work-related foreclosed the argument that the surgery to fix the non-union was
not work-related. She again awarded PTD and other benefits, and Huntsman again filed a
motion for review. Upon review, the Commission found that Quast was not entitled to PTD
benefits, but affinned the decision otherwise. Quast petitioned for review to the Utah Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commissioner's decision, and allowed the
ALJ' s award of benefits to stand.
3.

Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal
The following facts are found in the Commission' s Order on Review of June 2, 2014

(see generally R. 272-273):
"Quast has a learning disability and dropped out of high school in the 12th grade.
Quast's employment background consists of working as a hospital housekeeper, where she
was required occasional heavy lifting, cleaning bathrooms, taking out the trash, washing
walls and floors, making beds, cleaning furniture, and dusting. She has a history ofurological
problems in addition to migraines and chronic back pain. Quast has suffered various work
injuries over the years and has been assessed with different work restrictions as a result;
however, there is no indication that she had permanent restrictions as a result of such injuries.
On May 16, 2007, Quast was working for Huntsman when she slipped on a wet floor
-4-
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and fell to the ground. She underwent decompression and fusion surgery on her thoracic
spine perfonned by Dr. Patel in July 2008. Quast and Huntsman entered into a stipulation that
Quast sustained an "injury by accident while in the course and scope of her employment with
[Huntsman]." The parties further agreed that the accident "permanently aggravated [Quast' s]
pre-existing thoracic condition" and that the 2008 surgery was necessary due to the accident.
After she was released to return to work, Quast worked for about a month before
resigning. Quast's mid-back pain persisted after the surgery... Quast followed up with Dr.
Patel, who ordered a CT scan to diagnose her continued back pain. Dr. Patel diagnosed Quast
with a nonunion in her thoracic spine at the Tl 1 level and unstable hardware installed during
the 2008 surgery... Dr. Patel perfonned a surgical revision later in September 2010 and
confirmed the nonunion and failed hardware diagnosis postoperatively.
Following the 2010 surgery, Dr. Lawrence, who took over for Dr. Patel, opined that
Quast showed significant improvement since the last surgery and was doing well overall
despite her complaints of continued back pain. Quast underwent another functional capacity
evaluation in 2012 administered by Ms. Marchant, who concluded that Quast could lift 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and still demonstrated the capacity for light
work...
Quast testified that she has not attempted to find work since the 2008 surgery.
Huntsman presented the testimony of two different vocational rehabilitation experts, Mr.
Hiatt and Mr. Barnes, who testified that Ms. Quast could return to work as a housekeeper at
-5-

a hotel or an assisted living facility based on her lifting restriction. Neither Mr. Barnes nor
Mr. Hiatt could state whether such positions required repetitive bending or reaching." (Id.).
Both Judge Hann and Judge Marlowe found that the issue of whether the thoracic
spine surgery in 2010 was work-related was foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties. (R.
180-187; 222-232). The Commission agreed, and this has not been cross-appealed. (R. 274).
Based upon Quast's thoracic spine injury, and resulting limitations, Judge Hann and Judge
Marlowe both found her pennanently, totally disabled, and awarded PTD benefits. The
Commission set aside that award of PTD benefits. Quast petitioned for review of that

•

decision setting aside PTD benefits. Huntsman did not cross-appeal on any issues, but argued
that the denial of benefits should be affirmed because the Commissioner's findings in favor
of Quast were not supported by "substantial evidence". Additionally, Huntsman argued that
the Commissioner improperly switched the burden of proof from Quast to it, on the issue of
"other work reasonably available".
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the Commission had improperly added an
extra-statutory gloss on the PTD statute, i.e. whether Quast retained "a reasonable degree of

•

strength and flexibility" . Without this gloss, the Commission had already found in Quast's
favor on the explicit statutory requirements, so the Comi of Appeals simply ordered that the
ALJ's decision awarding benefits stand. The Court of Appeals implicitly upheld the
Commission's findings, that Quast could not perform the "essential functions" of her prior
work, and that there was no "other work reasonably available" to her. The Court of Appeals
-6-
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did not discuss Huntsman's claim that the Commissioner had improperly switched the burden
of proof. Quast denied that the burden of proof had, in fact, been switched.
Huntsman petitioned for certiorari on the question whether the Commission erred in
adding a medical inquiry beyond whether Quast's industrial injury placed limits on her abi lity
to perform basic work activities. It also petitioned for certiorari on the question whether the
burden of proof had been improperly switched from Quast to it.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals con-ectly supported the Commission's decision that Quast
suffered a "significant impairment" because it was well-supported by substantial evidence,
Likewise, the Court of Appeals con-ectly affinned the Commission's findings that Quast
could not return to her prior work, and had no "other work reasonably available", because
they, too, were supported by "substantial evidence". Huntsman has not marshaled the
evidence in favor of Quast, but relies essentially on cherry-picking its own evidence. This
does not carry its burden of persuasion that the Commission's decision on these issues was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
The Commission's decision that Quast did not have an "impairment .. . that limit[s]
[her] ability to perform basic work activities" was logically inconsistent with its conclusion
that Quast had a "significant impairment". Further, the Commission's conclusion was
logically inconsistent with its own findings of Quast' s work-related impairments, that Quast
could not perform the "essential functions" of her prior work, and could not perform "other
-7-

work reasonably available". Instead, the Commission denied Quast on the basis of a residual
medical capacity inquiry that the Court of Appeals correctly declared was not in the PTD
statute, and inconsistent with it.
The questions on certiorari seem to believe that the Commission's findings on the
statutory elements of permanent, total disability (PTD) were against Quast. Actually, they
were in her favor. The only issue on which Quast lost, at the Conunission, was the extra-

•

statutory residual medical functioning inquiry that the Court of Appeals rejected in Oliver
v. Labor Comm 'n . If that additional medical inquiry is improper, as beyond the statute, then

the Commission's findings in Quast's favor on the statutory elements are supported by
"substantial evidence", and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Question on Certiorari No. 1:
Whether the court of appeals en-ed in revers mg the Labor Commission's
determination that Respondent had failed to demonstrate that her ability to perfonn
basic work activities was limited?
Answer:
The Court of Appeals con-ectly recognized that two Administrative Law judges, and
the Commissioner, had detennined that Quast had a "significant impairment" that
placed a "limit on [her] ability to perform basic work activities", and properly rejected
the Commission's creation of an additional, extra-statutory analysis, which was
whether Quast had residual medical functional capacity at that step.
-8-
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QUESTION ONE
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT QUAST SUFFERED A
SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT FROM HER INDUSTRIAL INJURY, IT
NECESSARILY DETERMINED THAT QUAST'S ABILITY TO PERFORM
BASIC WORK ACTIVITIES WAS LIMITED.

A.

The Commission Properly Found Quast Suffered A "Significant Impairment".
The Commission found that Quast had a "significant impairment". Before, the Court

of Appeals, Huntsman conceded that " [t]here is evidence to support the Commission's
conclusion." (Brief of Respondent, p. 10.) While Huntsman asked the Court of Appeals to
re-weigh the evidence, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the conclusion of the
Commission that Quast suffered a "significant impairment". Huntsman has not sought
certiorari review of this conclusion. Therefore, it is now settled that Quast has suffered a
"significant impairment". This in turn dictates the conclusion that her impairment placed a
"limit on [her] ability to perform basic work activities", for the reasons infra.
B.

The Commission En-oneously Treated "Significant Impairment" And "Limit [On]
Ability To Perform Basic Work Activities" As Independent And Separate Inquiries,
With Different Meanings.
Both "significant impairment" and "limit on ability to perform basic work activities"

had well-established legal meanings when the Legislature adopted the current version of the
PTD statute, at Utah Code §34A-2-413(1995). Both phrases were richly developed in federal
Social Security law, prior to 1995. As a general rule, when the Legislature uses a term or
phrase with a well-established legal meaning, it is assumed to have incorporated that
-9-

meaning into the statutory use. " When interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary
indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually
accepted meaning." Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc. , 2009 UT 69, ~ 32, 219 P.3d 918, 926. And when
the Legislature uses a phrase with a specific legal meaning, the Utah Supreme Court assumes
that the Legislature meant that same legal meaning.
The legislature · is entitled to invoke specialized legal terms that carry an
extra-ordinary meaning. And when it does so we credit the legal term of art,
not the common understanding of the words. See Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ~ 19,
270 P.3d 531. Thus, 11 when a word or phrase is ' transplanted from another
legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil
with it. ' 11 Maxfield v. Herbert, 20 12 UT 44, ~ 31,284 P.3d 647 (quoting Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L.REV. 527, 537 (1947)).

State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ~28; 308 P .3d 517, 523. The phrases "significant impairment"
and "limit [on] ability to perfonn basic work activities" both have roots in the same federal
soil, namely, the so-called "severity regulation" in Social Security law, at 20 C.F.R. §
404.1521. This Court has previously adopted the federal understanding of subsection (b) of
this "severity regulation" in Provo Cityv. Serrano, 2015 UT 32, ~28, 345 P.3d 1242, 1250,
stating that we "look to identical language used in federal social security law ... ".
Quast's case highlights the other part of the "severity regulation", or subsection (a).
This part of the "severity regulation" is found at Utah Code §34A-2-413 ( 1)(b)(i). The correct
understanding of this regulation, as codified in Utah, is drawn from the histmy of the
"severity regulation", and the United State Supreme Court case which interpreted it, in light

-1 0-
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ofthe Social Security Administration's statement of policy interpreting this regulation, found
at SSR 85-28.
SSR 85-28 gives the history of this regulation, and the intended application of it. In
summary, the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(l)(A), grants benefits to a person with a
disability of sufficient duration. 42 U.S .C. 423(d)(2)(A) then defines disability as the result
of an impairment "of such severity" as to cause inability to work. The ·phrase "of such
severity" is not statutorily defined. In order to give some substance to the phrase, 20 C.F .R.
§404 .15 21 was promulgated, the so-called "severity regulation" . This regulation introduced
the notion of a threshold medical showing of limitation on ability to perfonn "basic work
activities". The Social Security Administration sought to use this as a medical threshold, to
dismiss claims before proceeding to adjudicate vocational issues. Due to widespread
evidence that the "severity regulation" was being applied to deny claimants who were in fact
unable to work due to disability, the federal comts began enjoining or limiting the use of the
"severity regulation". Finally, the Social Security Administration issued a ruling to "clarify"
that it intend the "severity regulation" to be used to "weed out" insubstantial claims that
could never result of a finding of vocational disability. On the basis of this ruling, the United
State Supreme Court upheld the validity of the "severity regulation" in Bowen v. Yukert, 482
U.S. 137 (1987); 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119, 55 USLW 4735.
Understanding this history is important because it was demonstrates the legal meaning
given to the phrases "significant impairment" and "limit [on] ability to perform basic work
-11-
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activities" prior to th e adoption of the Utah PTD statute in 1995. That is important because,
in 1995, the Utah PTD statute adopted the "severity regulation" in two paiis:
FROM THE FEDERAL SEVERITY REGULATION :
20C.F.R. §404. 152l(a):
"An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit
your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities."
TO THE UTAH PTO STATUTE IN 1995:
34A-2-413(1 )(b)(i):
From "An impairment or combination of impainnents is not severe if it does not

significantly . . ." to "significant impairment or combination of impairments ..
."(Emphasis added).
34A-2-413(1)(c)(ii):
" ... limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." adopted, substituting
"the employee's" for "your".

Utah's statutory adoption of the "severity regulation" only varies from the federal regulation
in the placement of the modifier "significant". This change in placement does not change the

•

meaning, but makes it less awkward to understand by stating it positively rather than in the
negative. This answers the Fund' s concern that the word "limit" has no modifier, i.e., that
even a de minimus limitation would qualify for benefits. The modifier "significant" was
moved from its position next to "limit" and placed next to "impairment". In either position,
it still operates to bar de minimus claims of impairment or limitation.
-12-
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The other difference is how the Utah legislature broke the "severity regulation" into
two halves, and placed "significant impairment" in Utah Code §34A-2-4 l 3( 1)(b) and the rest
of the "severity regulation" in Utah Code §34A-2-4 13(l)(c). This makes sense, because, as
the "severity regulation" makes clear, it is defining "significant impairment" as an
impairment that places a " limit [on] ability to do basic work activities." The placement of
those two halves in the Utah PTD statute is consistent with the use of the term "permanent,
total disability", followed by a statutory definition of that term:

-13-

Employee Must Show:

Elements (subsection (b )):

Definitions of elements (subsection (c )):

Medical
"Significant impairment"
34A-2-413(1 )(b )(i)

"Impainnent that .. . limit the employee's
ability to do basic work activities"
34A-2-413(1 )(c)(ii)
" basic work activities" defined by
Commission Rule and 20 C.F.R. 404.1521

Vocational
"Permanent, total disability"
34A-2-413(1 )(b )(ii)

"Not gainfully employed"
34A-2-413(c)(i)
" impairments prevent employee from
p erforming essential functions" of
historical work activities
34A-2-413(1 )(c )(iii)
"employee cannot perform other work
reasonably available etc ... "
34A-2-413(c)(iii)

The overall point here is that, while the Utah PTD statute re-arranges the federal pieces
somewhat, the big picture remains the same. The substantive meaning of the PTD statute is
the same as the sequential decision-making process of Social Security, but re-arranged for
analytic clarity.
This now demonstrates the problem in Quast's case. The Commission found that
-14-
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Quast met the element "significant impairment", which is now res judicata. At the same time,
the Commission found that Quast did not meet the definition of "significant impai1ment",
i.e., an impairment which places a "limit [on her] ability to perfonn basic work activities."
In other words, the Commission found Quast "significantly impaired", while at the same time
not meeting the elements of being "significantly impaired" .
Quast resolved this internal contradiction by looking to the sequential decision-making
process of the Social Security Act, and the similar sequential layout of the Utah PTD statute.
C.

The Commission EtTed By Not Taking The PTD E lements In Sequential Order.
Historically. The PTD Statute Required Sequential Decision-Making.
As of 1991 , the predecessor to the cutTent PTD stated:
Permanent total disability ... requires a finding by the commission of total
disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making
process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the [C.F.R.].
The commission shall adopt rules that confo1m to the substance of the
sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(l) and (2), as
revised.

Utah Code§ 35-1-67(1)(1991). This specifically called for sequential decision-making.
Comparing The SSDI Sequential Decision-Making Process To The Utah PTD Statute.
To see that the sequential substance of the SSA decision-making process has been
codified in the 1995 PTD statute, compare the two, first decision-making process outlined
at 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a), then Utah Code §35- l-67( 1)(c)(l995):
Step One:

"At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing
-15-
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substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled." 20 C.F.R.
404. l 520(a)(4 )(i).

" . . . the commission shall conclude that .. . (i) the employee is not gainfully
employed ... ". Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(i)(l995).
Step Two:

"At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical
or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509 , or
a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you · are not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
404. l 520(a)(4 )(ii).
" .. . the commission shall conclude that . . . (ii) the employee has an
impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to
do basic work activities; .. .". Utah Code §35-1 -67(1)( c)(ii)(l 995). This is the
same thing; see infra.

Step Three:

"At the third step, we also consider the medical severity ofyour impairrnent(s).
If you have an impairrnent(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in
appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find
that you are disabled." 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
This third step refers an applicant to the medical impairment listings. If an
applicant meets one of these listings, he is presumed to be disabled without
further vocational analysis. The Utah Legislature did not adopt a statutory
counterpart to this SSA step.

Step Four:

"At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional
capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant
work, we will find that you are not disabled." 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
" . . . the commission shall conclude that . . .(iii) the industrial or occupationally
caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee from
performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident . . .
Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(iii)(1995).

Step Five:

"At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual
-16-

•
•

functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see
if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment
to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an
adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled." 20 C.F.R.
404. l 520(a)(4)(v).

" ... the commission shall conclude that ... (iv) the employee cannot perform
other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age,
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual
functional capacity. Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(iv)(l995).
Note that for cases arising before 1995, the Commission has explicitly adopted the SSA
sequential decision-making regulations in UT Admin. Code R612-200-5B. Permanent Total
Disability.
Quast argued to the Court of Appeals that the Commission, by finding that she met
the vocational requirements of the PTD statute, necessarily met the medical impairment
threshold. This is consistent with SSR 85-28, which points out that:
By definition, basic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to
do most jobs. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
that an individual whose impairments do not preclude the performance ofbasic
work activities is, therefore, able to perform his or her past relevant work.
SSR 85-28. The converse is true also: if a worker is unable to perform "past relevant work"
and cannot perf01m "other work reasonably available", they must necessarily have a
significant impairment that limits the ability to perf01m "basic work activities".'

1

Huntsman argues that the absence of direct incorporation of federal law into
Section 413 precludes reference to established legal meaning of specific words or
phrases. This contradicts the Commission' s adoption of the federal meaning of the phrase
"basic work activities", and the Court's reference to regulations in Provo City v. Serrano.
-1 7-

•
D.

The Court Of Appeals Correctly Rejected The Commission's Attempt To Read ExtraStatutory Burdens Into The PTD Statute.
The Court of Appeals correctly refused to read the "severity regulation", as adopted

in the Utah PTD statute, as requiring anything more than a showing that an impairment
placed a " limit [on] ability to perform basic work activities." In Quast's case, that meant a
showing that her industrial medical impairment limited her ability to walk, stand, sit, lift,
bend or twist, which are all "basic work activities". Her medical records clearly established
that she had these limitations, on an industrial basis. The Commission' s finding that Quast
had a "significant impairment" confinned this, and was supported by substantial evidence.
The Commission went beyond this, to consider whether, despite these limitations, she
"still has a reasonable degree of strength and flexibility". This inquiry into what Quast retains
AFTER her industrial limitations is exactly contrary to the statute. The "significant
impairment" inquiry is a threshold inquiry at the start, not an analysis of what is left over at
the end of the inquiry.
The apparent reason that the Commission felt the need to add additional statutory
language is to respond to the concern of the Fund that the word " limit" is without "limit", so
to speak. This concern is gone if one understands that the word " limit" is " limited" by the
modifier "significant" in both the Social Security program and the Utah Act. In the Social
Security Act, the modifier "significant" appears in the regulation interpreting the statutory
words "such severity". I.e., for Social Security, an impairment is "severe" if it "significantly

-18-
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limit[s] your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." In the Utah Act, the
modifier "significant" appears in the statute itself, ( 1)(b ), "significant impainnent". ( 1)( c)(ii)
defines the ,;,,,ord "significant" as "an impairment[ ... ] that limit[s] the employee's ability to
do basic work activities." See discussion supra.

.

If one does not understand that (1 )(c)(ii) is a definiti on of (1 )(b), then there is no
"limit" to the concept of a "limit". But if one understands that (l)(c)(ii) is a definition of
"significant impairment", then the definition is modified by the word "significant" in ( 1)(b),
or incorporated into it. Additionally, the federal usage of the phrase, and the context of the
sequential decision-making of the Utah PTD both place a "limit" on the concept of "limit".
They illuminate the meaning. There is no need for confusion.
The Court of Appeals correctly treated "limit ... basic work activities" as a medical
question, not a vocational question. And it correctly evaluated the limitations that Quast' s
injuries had on her ability to perform basic work activities. It correctly concluded that the
undisputed medical evidence found by the Commissioner pointed without question to a
conclusion that Quast suffered a "significant impainnent", i.e., a "limit [of her] ability to do
basic work activities." The Comi of Appeals correctly rejected this attempt to read an extrastatutory burden into the PTD statute, a burden that went beyond a "limit [on] ability to
perform basic work activities."2

2

The Court of Appeals overstated its holding in one sentence: "There is no
qualitative restriction before a finding of "limited" can be made." Quast, at 19. The
-19-

QUESTION TWO

Question on Certiorari No. 2:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that substantial evidence did not
support the Commission's conclusions.
Answer:
As to whether Quast suffered a "significant impairment", that issue is
addressed supra. The Commission found that Quast suffered a "significant
impainnent", and Huntsman conceded on appeal that evidence supported this. The
Court of Appeals correctly refused to re-weigh the evidence on this point. The
Commission erroneously went beyond this.
As to whether Quast was prevented by her "significant impairments" from

•

"performing the essential functions" ofher prior work, two ALJsand the Commission
concluded that Quast was unable to return to her prior work as a housekeeper. This

•

conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, as the Court of Appeals correctly
recognized. Huntsman did not seek ce1iiorari on this issue, and did not brief it. Quast
does not understand this to be in dispute, on certiorari. As explained supra, this
finding alone requires the conclusion that Quast met the medical severity threshold.
The Commission's conclusion was that Quast was w1able to do "other work

qualitative restriction is that a limitation be "significant", i.e., more than minimal,
consistent with the "severity regulation" as well as S.S.R. 85-28.
-20-
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reasonably available". That conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, as the
Court of Appeals c01Tectly recognized. Huntsman did not seek certiorari on the
question whether substantial evidence supported the findings by two ALJs and the
Commission that Quast was unable to return to other work reasonably available. As
to the burden of proof question on this issue, see infra. Regardless of whether the
legal burden of proof issue was preserved or harmless error, the finding itself was
supported by substantial evidence.

QUESTION THREE
HUNTSMAN FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE ITS OBJECTION
TO THE COM:MISSION'S USE OF "BURDEN OF SHOWING"
Question on Certiorari No. 3:
Whether the court of appeals erred in accepting the Commission's statement regarding
burdens of proof with respect to the question of the availability of other work and in
declining to treat Petitioner's challenge to that statement as an alternate ground for
affirmance.
Answer to Question No. 3:
This issue was not properly preserved below. Given the lack of preservation, it is
unclear exactly what the Commissioner meant when discussing the "burden" imposed
on Huntsman. Quast presumes that the Commissioner was familiar with Martinez v.

Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42; 164 P.3d 384, which placed the ultimate burden
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of proof on the worker. Quast therefore assumes that the Commissioner was refen-ing
to the burden of going forward, after Quast's primafacie showing of inability to do
"other work reasonably availab le". Or possibly the Conunissioner meant the burden
of persuasion in overturning the findings of two different ALJs on that issue. Either

•

conclusion would be justified. Because Huntsman failed to preserve this issue by
asking the Commissioner what she meant, all one can do at this point is speculate.
A.

•

The Commissioner Meant The Burden Of Going Forward, To Rebut Quast's Prima
Facie Showing Of Permanent Total Disability.
The Commissioner did not say the "burden of proof' was on Huntsman, despite the

phrasing of the question on certiorari. She merely said, Huntsman's "burden of showing".
This is no small distinction. The "burden of showing", in other words, going forward, arises
after the party with the burden of proof makes aprimafacie case:
A prima facie case has been made when evidence has been received at trial
that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party having the
burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 2
Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954).

Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, 1114; 20 P.3d 388, 392.
Quast made an initial showing suffic ient to persuade both ALJs and the Conunission
that there was no "other work reasonably available" . See e.g., 1/31/14 Order on Remand, p.
8. In the absence of contrary evidence, Quast would have been entitled to a decision in her
favor, as a matter of law. Bair, supra. Huntsman attempted to factually rebut this by calling
vocational witnesses, to testify that Quast could indeed work as a housekeeper, despite her
-22-
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limitations. The ALJ and the Commission fou nd that Huntsman fa iled to pull off this factual
offer of proof, i.e., failed its burden of showing what it set out to prove. Huntsman had no
obligation to call any vocational witnesses at all, and could have chosen to rely solely upon
Quast's ability to cany her legal burden of proof. This strategy ran the risk of losing, given
Quast's compelling evidence. Rather than place all its eggs in that basket, Huntsman
affirmatively offered vocational evidence, which was not persuasive, in ·opposing Quast's
proof. The Commissioner undoubtedly meant nothing more.
B.

Huntsman Failed To Cany Its Burden Of Persuasion On Administrative Review, That
Two Different ALJs Erred In Concluding That Quast Could Not Perform "Other
Work Reasonably Available".
Alternatively, the Commissioner may have meant that Huntsman failed to cany its

"burden" of persuasion to reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law of Judge
Marlowe, and Judge Hann, including the finding that Quast could not "perform other work
reasonably available". Upon this administrative review, the Commissioner reviewed a "cold"
evidentiary record. The statutory basis for this administrative review is Utah Code §630-430 I (2008). This statute does not contain any statement of the standard of review that the
Commission should use in reviewing findings of fact by the ALJ. Courts across the country
vary on this question, often depending on the specific language of the workers compensation
system. See generally, Larson, Workmen's Compensation §130.03D[3], listing the various
approaches by jurisdiction. California's approach gives recognition to the fact that the
Commission reviews a "cold" record, whereas the ALJ has first-hand opportunity to view the
-23-

testimony of the witnesses:
When the WCJ's finding is supported by solid, credible evidence, it is to be
accorded great weight by the Board and should be rejected only on the basis
of contrary evidence of considerable substantiality; and the WCJ's findings on
credibility are entitled to great weight because the WCJ has the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in
connection with their manner on the stand.
Rubalcava v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. , 220 Cal.App.3d 901,269 Cal.Rptr. 656 (2d Dist.,

4th Div. 1990). This approach is sound, and should be adopted, in reviewing the
Commission's decision to endorse or reject the decisions of ALJs.
Where the decision being reviewed relies upon first-hand encounter with facts and
other matters not "adequately reflected in the record available to appellate comis", State v.
Levin, 2006 UT 50, ~25, 144 P.3d 1096, deference is required. On the other hand, where, as

here, "the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to resolve the issue", nondeferential review is appropriate. In Re Baby B, 2012 UT 35, ~43, 308 P.3d 394. The Levin
factors referred to in In Re Baby B were elaborated upon in a companion case, Sawyer v.
Dep't of Worliforce Serv., 2015 UT 33. There, the Court stated that the standard of review

was trending toward a "binary" result: fact-like detenninations receive deferential review,
and law-like determinations receive de novo review. If it is appropriate for the appellate
courts to give deference to trial courts who actually face the witnesses, it is appropriate for
the Commissioner to give deference to the findings of fact made by ALJs who actually face
and evaluate witnesses.

•
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Quast relied upon the evidentiary facts found by Judge Hann and Judge Marlowe. It
is reasonable to conclude that, upon administrative review, the Commission, giving deference

•

to the ALJs fact-finding, found that Huntsman had failed to carry its burden of persuasion
that these two ALJs, who had the opportunity to eyeball the witnesses, had gotten it wrong.
Both AL.Ts specifically held Quast to the ultimate burden of proof on all elements of PTD,
in accord withMartinezv. Media-Paymaster. Both AL.Ts found that Quast carried that burden
of proof on all elements, including proof that she could not "perform other work reasonably
available" . The Commission declined to disturb these conclusions, granting deference to the
AL.Ts on disputed issues of credibility and face-to-face evaluation of witnesses.
C.

Any Error By The Commissioner In Describing The Burden Of Proof Is Harmless.
Quast believes this entire issue to be a red herring, because there was no evidence in

the record to conclude otherwise than how the Commissioner did. In other words, there was
no contrary evidence that Quast could do other work reasonably available. The ALJs both
made specific findings of fact that Quast's employment with Huntsman did involve bending
and twisting. Huntsman's vocational witnesses did not know whether Quast's limitations on
bending or twisting would preclude her from other work as a housekeeper. They offered only
other housekeeping and light assembly as other vocational possibilities. But they were
unfamiliar with the specific physical demands of those jobs. The Commissioner herself
stated that Huntsman's experts "did not sufficiently address her restriction against repetitive
bending of the spine", and rejected that testimony. (Order on Motion for Review, p. 7). Judge
-25-

Marlowe found that Huntsman's expert "did not knov,1 the specific job tasks" for other
housekeeping work. She found that Huntsman's experts "were not aware of the specific job
requirements for [light assembly work] and was (sic] unable to provide any details as to the
physical requirements of these jobs other than meeting [Quast' s] lifting weight restrictions."

•

(J. Marlowe Findings and Conclusions, p. 8-9). On that basis, the ALJs and the

Commissioner discounted those vocational witnesses entirely. This left no evidence in the
record to conclude that there was any "other work reasonably available" to Quast, and an
abundance of evidence that there was no "other work reasonably available". Regardless of
who had the burden of proof, there was no evidence of other work reasonably available to
Quast. On the other hand, there was ample evidence that Quast could not do other work, as
both ALJs and the Commissioner concluded.
The "substantial evidence" that Huntsman argues supports a finding that Quast had
"other work reasonably available" is its own vocational witnesses. (Petitioner' s Brief on
Certiorari, p. 18). However, this is same evidence that both ALJs and the Commissioner
rejected. Quast is not able to understand how evidence rejected by both ALJs and the
Commissioner can be "substantial evidence" to supp01t the Commission' s conclusion.
For Huntsman to show that the Commissioner's statement on burden was not
hannless, it would have to marshal the facts, to the extent necessary to persuade the Comt
of Appeals or this Court that there was some other conclusion that could have been reached
on this record. Huntsman has not attempted this marshaling, but merely relies upon an
-26-
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alleged inconect legal statement of burden of proof. All one needs to do is read the facts
recited in the ALJs' rulings and the Commissioner' s decision, to realize why Huntsman has
not marshaled the factual record:
[Quast] also has a very limited intellectual functioning. [Quast] was not able
to complete high school even with the assistance of special education. [Quast]
has a limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. [Quast] also
suffer from a developmental disability. [Quast] received special education and
dropped out of high school in the 12th grade. [Quast] testified she suffers from
dyslexia, which causes her to read things upside down or backwards.

***
[Quast] is 39 years old and dropped out of high school in 12th grade. [Quast]
was in special education classes in high school and suffers from a learning
disability. [Quast's] work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result
ofthe [industrial injury], she is restricted to lifting no more than 20 pounds and
must avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of the thoracic spine. [Quast]
also has limited intellectual abilities. [Quast' s] work history is unskilled labor.
As a result, she does not possess transfenable work skills.
ALJ (Marlowe), Findings of Fact, p. 6-8. 3 Quast has an IQ that ranges from 55-60, to at most,
70. (R. 47-48, 181,228). The Commissioner did not find that Quast had transferrable work
skills, nor did Huntsman ever argue that there were any. Quast's intellectual and learning
disabilities were undisputed. Her work history was undisputed. On this record, no other
conclusion could have been drawn but that Quast was totally disabled.

3

Huntsman' s doctor stated that Quast retained "full functional range of motion in her
entire spine." Order on Review, p. 7. This is a medical impossibility. Quast's spine is fused from
T7-T12. (J. Marlowe, FF/CL, p. 6). This makes it anatomically impossible to bend or twist her
back normally. Further, Quast has a 22% impairment of her spine. (Id.) It is not possible to have
"full functional range of motion in her entire spine" with a 22% impairment.
-27-

Anyway, any error in understanding the burden of proof would not constitute an
alternate ground for affirmance of the denial of benefits. Remand here would be pointless,
because the record contains no evidence there was any other work reasonably available to
Quast, given her intellectual and physical limitations. Any error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commission's conclusions in favor of
Quast on the statutory elements of PTD, because they were supported by "substantial
evidence". Specifically, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commissioner' s
conclusion that Quast suffered a "significant impairment". This necessarily meant that Quast
had a "limit [on her] ability to perform basic work activities." The Court of Appeals correctly
rejected the Commission's use of an extra-statutory residual medical functioning inquiry,
which does not logically connect to the initial "severity" inquiry, as codified by the Utah PTD
statute. Remaining medical functioning might justify a re-employment effort, after a finding
of PTD, but it makes no sense to apply this as a bar to an initial finding of PTD. The Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commission's finding that Quast could not perform the
" essential functions" of her prior housekeeping employment was supported by "substantial
evidence". Finally, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the Commissioner's conclusion
that the record supported the ALJs' conclusion that Quast could not perform any "other work
reasonably available", and that Huntsman had failed to rebut Quast's primafacie showing.
The Commission is using the statutory requirement that a worker show impairments
-28-

that " limit the employee's ability to perform basic work activities" as a roadblock to deny
benefits to workers otherwise unable to participate in the workforce. This distorts the
accepted legal meaning of this plu·ase. This Court has clearly stated that terms with specific
legal meanings in the Social Security context are to be given those same meanings under
state law. This phrase, which is the definition of "significant impairment", is a minimal,
threshold showing of medical impainnent. It is not some super-disability category. The
United States Supreme Court noted that every federal circuit had rejected the similar use of
this phrase to deny persons who were actually disabled. The SSA issued SSR 85-28 to
"clarify" that it would only use the limitation on "basic work activities" as a threshold
screening test, to weed out applicants who could not show disability due to a minimal
medical impairment. This usage was well-understood when Utah adopted the PTD statute in
1995.
Quast is precluded by her injury from participation in the work force, either her prior
work, or "other work reasonably available". The Commission has created some superdisability standard, that goes beyond inability to participate in the labor force. This goes
beyond the statutory requirements. The Court ofAppeals correctly rejected the Commission's
extra-statutory standard, and remanded for entry of an Order of pennanent, total disability
benefits, in accordance with the decisions of Judge Hann, Judge Marlowe, and the
Commission's own finding that Quast cannot return to prior work and there is no other work
"reasonably available". The Court of Appeals should be affinned.
-29-
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ADDENDUM "A"

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order, March 10, 2011.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Heber M Wells Building, 3rd Floor
160 E 300 S, 3rd Fl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
(801) 530-6800

RASHELL QUAST,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 10-0208
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HUNTSMAN
CANCER HOSPITAL and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND,
Respondent.

Judge Debbie L. Hann

HEARING:

Labor Commission, 160 E 300 S, Salt Lake City, UT 8411.4-6615, Room 332 on January 27, 2011 at 8:00 AM. Said_He~ing was pursuantto Qrder
and Not1ce .of the Commission.
·
..

BEFORE: ·

pebbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Rashell Quast, was present and represeI?-ted by her attorney
· Kevin Robson Esq.
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and
Workers Compensation Fund, were represented by attorney Hans
Scheffler Esq.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner's March 22, 2010 Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical
expenses, recommcmded ·medical care, temporary total disability compensation, temporary partial
disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, permanent total disability
compensation and·interest. The Commission began a formal adjudication of the petitioner's
claim on March 24, 2010 with an Order for Answer.
·
The respondents' April 26, 2010 Answer admits the petitioner was injured by accident on the
date alleged and that she suffered injuries consistent with the parties' stipulation, approved by
the Commission on .January 8, 2009. The respondents denied that the petitioµer is entitled to any
additional compensation or medical treatment or that she is permanently totally disabled as the
result of the industrial accident.

I
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers Compensation
Fund Case No. 10-0208
Page 2

At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew her claims for temporary compensation because
compensation was paid through March 19, 2010. The petitioner requested permanent total
disability compensation beginning March 19, 2010 and payment for the September 2010 back
surgery and ongoing treatment.
The respondents agreed, based upon the January 8, 2009 Stipulation and Order issued in Case
No. 08-0988, that the petitioner's May 16, 2007 industrial accident caused a pennanent
aggravation of her pre-existing back condition. The respondents disputed that the petitioner is
permanently totally disabled as the result of this accident and that it is not the direct cause of her
inability to work.

r
1

r

'

The parties stipulated the petitioner's compensation rate for this claim is $282.00 per week.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with
the respondent, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital on May 16, 2007 which resulted
in a permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic condition resulting in a decompression
and fusion surgery _on July 1, 2008. (Exhibit R2).
The petitioner is not gainfully employed. The petitioner returned to her job and attempted to
work for about 1.5 months after her July 2008 surgery. The petitioner was .unable to physically
perfo1m her job duties as a housekeeper for the respondent. The petitioner's last day worked was
two months and 3 weeks prior to her September 7, 2010 surgery which would have been June 17,,.
2010. This surgery was performed to repair the petitioner?s non-union from the July 1, 2008
surgery. Medical exhibit 141, 874-877.
The petitioner has a significant impairment. The petitioner's thoracic spin_e is fused from T7T12. She is now limited to lifting 20 pormds and must avoid any repetitive flexion or extension
of her thoracic spine. The petitioner's :thoracic spine condition has been rated at 22% whole
person, of which 12% is due to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner also suffers
from a developmental disability. The petitioner received special education and dropped out of
high school in the 12th grade. 1 The petitioner testified she suffers from dyslexia, which causes
her to read things·upside down or backwards. The petitioner also suffered from chronic pain and
depression prior to the industrial accident. The petitioner was also born with ~derdeveloped
kidneys and now bas only one kidney. The petitioner had bilateral upper extremity pain which
has been surgically treated. She also suffers from migraines.
1

Although-not presented as an exhibit at the hearing, attached to the petitioner's Application for Hearing is a copy of
the February 17, 2010 Not!ce of Attorney Advisor Decision-Fully Favorable which granted the petitioner Social
Security Disability benefits on the basis of her thoracic spine condition and borderline intellectual functioning. The
decision notes that psychological testing conducted as part of the Social Security evaluation revealed below average
intellectual functioning, including a full scale intelligence quotient score of only 70. This evidence must be
addressed in any subsequent proceedings related to re-employment.

r
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The petitioner has a limited ability to do basic work. The petitioner suffers from a 22% whole
person impairment of her thoracic spine which limits her ability to lift more than 20 pounds or to
flex or extend her thoracic spine. The petitioner also has a very limited intellectual functioning.
The petitioner was not able to complete high school even with the assistance of special
education. The petitioner has a limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. The
combination of the petitioner's physical and intellectual limitations limit her ability to perform
basic work activities.
The petitioner's thoracic back condition as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident
prevents her from performing the essential functions of the basic work activities for which she
was qualified to perform at the time of industrial accident. The petitioner has worked as a
housekeeper in hospitals for about 20 years. The petitioner was required to lift 50-70 pounds,
clean bathrooms, wash walls, clean furniture, mal<e and clean beds, sweep and mop floors and
dust. HousekeeP,ing in a hospital setting is medium level physical demand work. The
petitioner's work restriction of no lifting over 20 pounds alone takes her out of this category of
work. The petitioner has no other work experience.
The petitioner is 39 years old a:hd dropped out of high school in 12th grade. The petitioner was iri.
special education t:lasses in high school and suffers from -a learning disaqility. The petitioner's
work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result of the May 1p, 2007 accident, she is
restricted ·to lifting no more than 20 pounds and must avoid any repetitive flexion and extension
of her thoracic spine. The petitioner also has limited intellectual abilities. .
The petitioner's work history 1s unskilled labor.
transferrable work· skills.

As a result, she does not possess any

Mike Hyatt, the respondents' vocational expert, believes the petitioner can perform work as a
hotel/motel housel<;eeper because it meets the light category of work which is the category of
-work that does-not require lifting over 20 pounds.
Working as a hotel/motel housekeeper would require the petitioner to change linens, strip and
make beds, vacuum, clean bathrooms, empty garbage cans and dust. Stripping a bed requires the
blanket and cover to be pulled off and the sheets and pillow cases removed. The majority of
hotels and motels do not utilize fitted sheets, requiring extra bending at the thpracic level to fold
corners when making the bed with fresh linens. Cleaning bathrooms requires the petitioner to
mop floors and clean the sinks and counter at waist level requiring bending at the thoracic level.
Cleaning over sink mirrors also requires reaching upward and forward. Most hotel/motel
bathrooms contain a tub/shower combination that requires reaching and bending with the upper
body to clean. Cleaning a toilet also requires bending and reaching of the upper body.
Vacuuming carpet requires movement of more than the arm maneuvering the vacuum. This ~k
too requires flexion and extension of the thoracic spine. A hotel/motel housekeeper is required
to clean many rooms a day at a quick pace. Although the lifting requirements are 20 pounds or
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less, the majority of tasks a hotel/motel housekeeper performs require repetitive extension and
flexion of the thoracic spine. The job of hotel/motel housekeeper would require the petitioner to
engage in repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine and exceeds her medical
restrictions as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident.
Paul Barnes, the respondent's vocational expert believes the petitioner can perform a job at
Avalon Health Care, an assisted living home for veterans, as a housekeeper. Mr. Barnes did not
know the specific job tasks other than having past experience and being able to read, write and
follow oral and written directions. An assisted living home would have bedrooms and
bathrooms where the residents live that a housekeeper would clean. The housekeeping tasks
would be the same or similar to that of a hotel/motel housekeeper. Based upon the above
findings related to hotel/motel housekeeping, a housekeeper in an assisted living home would
require repetitive flexion and extension of the petitioner's thoracic spine and exceed her work
restrictions as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident.
Mr. Barnes also opined that the petitioner could engage in light assembly work assembling light
medical plastics and that job openings exist Optima Consulting and Integra Life Sciences. Mr. ·
Barnes was not aware of the specific job requirements for these jobs and was unable to provide
any details as to-th~ physical requirements of these jobs other than meeting the petitioner's lifting
weight limitation. •In identifying light housekeeping and light assembly work as other work the
petitioner could perform, Mr. Hyatt agreed that bending and reaching is not always noted in the
Dictionary_of Occupational Titles, which formed the basis of his opinion. The undersigned finds
that most assembly work requires rapid reaching and bending Qf the upper back to assemble
parts, either at a work station table or an assembly line. Neither Mr. Barnes nor Mr. Hyatt
described the jobs they identified as not having this requirement.

The other work identified by the respondents does not meet the petitioner's work limitation of
having to avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine.
The petitioner cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration her age,
educ~tion, past woik experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. ·
The petitioner has very limited intellectual abilities and her work history is dominated by one
task: cleaning. Although the petitioner suffered from many conditions, including depression,
chronic pain, including neck and back pain, migraines, incontinence, upper extremity pain and
other ailments, she continued to do her work as a hospital hous'ekeeper, classified as medium
level physical demand work, until the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner also tried
to return to her work as a housekeeper following treatment for her injuries as the result of this
accident but was not successful due to her physical ·limitations following the thoracic fusion
surgery. The petitioner did not have physical restrictions that prevented her from performing her
job duties until the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner's January 26, 2007
industrial injury is direct cause of the petitioner's permanent total disability
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The petitioner is preliminarily permanently totally disabled as the result of the May 16, 2007
industrial accident beginning June 18, 2010, when the petitioner was no longer able to work as
the result of his thoracic spine condition.
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the he petitioner's permanent total disability compensation
rate for the May 16, 2007 date of injury is $282.00 per week.
The petitioner is entitled to payment of medical expenses related to her September 7, 2010
thoracic surgery to repair the non-union from the prior surgery. There is no dispute that the
petitioner suffered a non-union. Both Dr. Patel and Dr. Newton agree on this point. Although
Dr. Newton opined that it was not "an urgency" he has not opined the surgery was not necessary
to treat this condition.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 requires compensation be paid only for those injuries arising out of
and in the course of employment. For an injury to be compensable under the Act, a petitioner
must show by evidence, opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or
her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability and in the event a petitioner cannot show a
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied. Allen v. Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
Utah Code§ 34A-2-413 state~ in relevant part:
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
· (b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
niust prove by a preponderance·of evidence that: .
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as
· a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent
total disability entitlement;
·
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment-or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for
which the employee h as been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim;
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and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, tal<ing into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.

** **
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial accident on May 16, 2007 while employed by
the respondent, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital.
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the May 16, 2007
industrial accident.
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers .Compensation
Fund, are liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation at the rate of
$282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order of the Commission.
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation
Fund, are liable to the petitioner for.treatment of her thoracic spine condition, including payment
for the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule plus
interest 'a t the rate of 8% per annum.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fµ.n,d, pay the petitioner subsistence benefits at the rate of
$282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order of the Coi;nmission.
Those amounts accrued to date are due and payable in a lump sum plus interest at the rate of 8%
per annum.
'•

•

J

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys' fees shall be paid directly to Paniel F.
Bertch Esq, 'according to Utah Code § 34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4.
That amount shall be deducted from petitioner's award and sent directly to Mr. Bertch's office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for necessary medical treatment
incurred to treat her thoracic spine condition as the result of the industrial accident, including,

I
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but not limited to, the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee
schedule, plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, notify the Commission in writing within 30 day of
the date of this order whether a re-employment plan shall be submitted. If the respondents elect
to submit a re-employment p lan within 30 days of the date of this order, the re-employment plan
shall be submitted to the Commission within 90 days of the date of this order.

DATED this {if;ay o ~ ~ , 2011.

Debbie L. Hann
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific pasis for
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 9ecisi9n is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
respons_e. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.

Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers Compensation
Fund Case No. I 0-0208
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 10, 2011, to the persons/parties at the
following addresses:
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Rashel I Quast
3831 S Hummingbird
Salt Lake City UT 84123
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital
2000 Cir Of Hope
Salt Lake City UT 84112
Workers Compensation Fund
Dennis V Lloyq Designated Agent
100 W Towne Ridge Pkwy
Sandy UT 84070
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Daniel F Bertch Esq
1996 E 6400 S Ste 100
Salt Lake City UT 84121
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Hans Scheffler Esq
Workers Compensation Fund Legal Dept
100 W Tow·ne Ridge Pkwy
Sandy UT 84070
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor
160 E. 300 S., 3rd Fl.
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

•

(801) 530-6800

RASHELL QUAST,

Petitioner,
vs.

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HUNTSMAN
CANCER HO SPITAL; WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUND,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER UPON REMAND
Case No. 10-0208
Judge Deidre Marlowe

Respondents.

Hearing:
August 7, 2012
Appearances:
Daniel F. Bertch for the Petitioner
Hans Scheffler for the Respondents

PROCEEDINGS
The Petitioner originally filed a claim with the Adjudication Division on August 13,
2008 regarding a May 16, 2007 industrial injury. That adjudication was assigned Case No.
08-0988. The parties did not participate in a hearing but resolved that case through a
stipulation.
In the stipulation the parties agreed that the Petitioner had sustained an injury by
accident while in the course and scope of her employment with the University ofUtah oµ
May 16, 2007 when she slipped and fell onto the floor, sustaining injuries to her mid-back,
left knee and left hip. More specifically, the pc1rties agreed ttiat the Petitioner's pre-existing
thoracic injury was aggravated by the industrial accident and that decompression surgery
on July 1, 2008 was necessitated by the accident. Respond~nts agreed to continue paying
any medical expenses necessitated by the accident. Respondents also agreed to pay
temporary total compensation from June 30, 2008 to September 17, 2008 and from
October 28, 2008 until the Petitioner became medically stable. The parties agreed that the
appropriate compensation weekly rate is $282.00.
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The parties also stipulated that there was no treatment necessary at the time for the
Petitioner's left knee and left hip, and that all medical expenses had been paid for those
claimed injuries to that date. The parties further stipulated that the Petitioner's urology
problems were not medically causally related to the industrial accident, and that the
Respondents were not liable for the Petitioner's narcotic medications. This stipulation was
accepted and approved by the Administrative Law Judge (ALI) Debbie Hann on January 7,
2009 and Case No. 08-0988 was dismissed.
The Petitioner filed the present adjudication on March 22, 2010, which is assigned
Case No. 10-0208, again regarding the industrial accident on May 16, 2007. The Petitioner
claims medical expenses, recommended care, temporary total compensation, temporary
partial compensation, permanent partial compensation, permanent total compensation,
and unpaid interest.
Respondents filed an Answer on April 26, 2010 indicating that they have paid the
Petitioner temporary total compensation from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009 in the total
amount of $13,123.92 and permanent partial compensation for a 12% whole perso_n
impairment in the amount of $10,558.08, as well as approximately $14,338.18 in medical
expenses. Respondents defend on the grounds that they have paid the Petitioner all claims
for which they are liable, and that the Petitioner's continuing medical conditions are not
medically causally related to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. Respondents further
argue that the Petitioner is not permanently totally disabled due to the industrial accident.
A hearing was held on January 27, 2011 before Judge Hann. At the hearing the
Petitioner withdrew her claim for temporary compensation because it had been paid
through March 19, 2010. She indicated that her permanent total compensation claim
begins on March 19, 2010, and clarified that her claim for medical expenses in.eludes a
September 2010 backsurgery and ongoing treatment..
Judge Hann issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order on March 10,
2011. Judge Hann concluded that the Petitioner was permanently totally disabled from the
May 16, 2007 industrial accident and ordered Respondents to begin paying the Petitioner
the subsistence benefits required by statute. Judge Hann also determined that the claimed
medical treatment (September 2010 surgery) was necessitated by the industrial accident,
and ordered the Respondents to pay those medical·expenses.
The Respondents filed a Motion for Review on April 11, 2011. Respondents argued
that the Petitioner's surgery was not necessitated by the industrial accident and that the
Petitioner was not permanently and totally disabled because of the accident, arguing that

she is capable of performing basic work activities and that there are suitable, available jobs
that she can perform. Respondents also argued that the case should have been sent to a
medical panel. The Petitioner filed an opposing memorandum.

•

•

•

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rashell Quast, Case No. 10-0208
Page 3

The Appeals Board issued an Order of Remand. Pursuant to that Order, Judge Hann
held a second hearing on August 7, 2012 and took additional evidence, including a new
medical exhibit which was filed on June 18, 2012 cons isting of six vo lumes and 1,549 pages.
The case has now been reassigned to Judge Marlowe, who has reviewed the evidentiary
record and completes this adjudication .

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l&gal and Medical Causation
Utah Code Annotated§ 34A-2-401 provides that an employee who is injured "by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment" can receive
benefits. In Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme
Court adopted a two-part test causation analysis. The first component deals with "legal
causation" while the second addresses "medical causation."
With regard to medical causation, the Petitioner must show that any conditions for
which he claims benefits are medically causally related to an industrial accident. "Under
the medical cause test, the claimant must show ... that the stress, strain or exertion
required by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability." Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). The burden of proof lies with the
Petitioner.
The parties have stipulated, and t he ALJ concludes, that the Petitioner was injured
by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the Respondent
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital on May 16, 2007 which resulted in a
permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic condition resulting in a decompression
and fusion surgery on July 1, 2008.

Scope of Remand
At the August 2, 2012 hearing, the parties disagreed as to the scope of the
acceptable evidence to be considered on remand. The Petitioner asserts that the medical
cause of the Petitioner's need for the second surgery cannot be addressed on remand
because that finding was not disturbed on review. The Respo ndents assert that the prior
findings were set aside so new medical evidence can be considered, which includes Dr.
Mattingly's opinion that the there is no medical causal connection between the Petitioner's
industrial accident and the need for a second surgery. As a result, the Respondents assert

this puts the Petitioner's functional restrictions resulting from her surgeries at issue,
because medical causation is at issue.
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The Remand Order includes findings of fact, stating, "The Appeals Board finds the
following facts to be material to the Hospital's motion for review." The Order then outlines
the following facts:
Ms. Quast suffered from a pre-existing thoracic-spine condition which she
permanently aggravated on May 16, 2007, when she slipped and fell while working
for the Hospital. To treat her injury, Ms. Quast underwent decompression and
fusion surgery on her thoracic spine on July 1, 2008.
Following the surgery, Ms. Quast's mid-back pain persisted and was eventually
diagnosed as nonunion of the fused vertebrae in her thoracic spine. In September
2010, Ms. Quast was given work restrictions of no lifting more than 20 pounds or
repetitive flexion or extension of her thoracic spine ....
None of these facts were inconsistent with the factual findings made in the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued on March 10, 2011. Instead, the
Commission ruled that there was insufficient evidence in the record after the second
surgery to properly evaluate the case, stating "there is no further opinion or information in
the record pertaining to Ms. Quast's current status, impairment or activity restrictions after
the September 2010 surgery." The Order then states:
Further information is required regarding Ms. Quast's current conditic;m in order to
properly determine whether she is entitled to permanent total disability
compensation. The Appeals·Board therefore remands the matter to Judge Hann to
hold additional proceedings as necessary to make additional findings pertaining to
Ms. Quast's impairment, activity restrictions and any other information regarding her
condition following the second surgery." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing in the Remand Order which requires reconsideration of the issue of
the medical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems. At the time of the January 27,
201.1 hearing, there was medical evidence in the record, specifically Dr. Newton'.s opinion,
that the Petitioner had "no medically verifiable injury that we can easily relate to the
industrial events ofS-16-07 . .. it is more likely than not that the TB-9 and T9-10 disc
protrusions were incidental findings .... So in summary I can only assume that if the
patient sustained any injury, it was a contusion of the left hip.'.' But, based upon the prior .
stipulation, approved by the Commission on January 8, 2009, the parties agreed that the
stipulation as to the medical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems was binding.
This was based upon Dr. Moress' evaluation and opinion that the Petitioner suffered a
permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic spine problems. The Stipulation states

in relevant part:
The parties agree that the May 16, 2007, industrial accident permanently
aggravated Petitioner's preexisting thoracic condition and that the thoracic

•
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decompression a nd fusion surgery performed on July 1, 2008, was related to the
Industrial accident ....
As a result, medical causation was not addressed at the January 27, 2011 hearing even
though Dr. Newton 's opinion was in conflict with those of Drs. Moress and Patel. The
Remand Order does not disturb any of these findings nor does it direct that the medical
causation dispute, which existed in the evidentiary record at the time of the hearing, now
be addressed.
Dr. Deborah Mattingly's opinion, rendered on April 12, 2012 after the Remand
Order was issued, opined the Petitioner suffered a temporary aggravation of her preexisting back problems because of the industrial accident Dr. Mattingly disagreed with the
medical opinions that the accident caused a permanent aggravation. Dr. Mattingly
referenced and agreed with Dr. Newton's opinion on this point. Dr. Mattingly assigned
permanent wo.rk restrictions of no lifting over 20 pounds, limited bending and alternate
sitting, standing and walking as needed. This is consistent with the work restrictions
assigned by Drs. Patel and Newton. However, Dr. Mattingly opined that none of these work
restrictions were the result of the industrial accident because it did not medically cause the
Petitioner's thoracic spine problems that resulted in surgical treatment. But, as outlined
above, the m_e dical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems was not reversed or
re-opened in the Remand Order.
The ALJ concludes that the medical cause of the Petiti9ner's thoracic spine probl~ms
exceeds the scope of the Remand Order. Dr. Mattingly's opinion of permanent work
restrictions is considered in the analysis below. However, the issue of medical causation of
the thoracic spine will not be re-opened or sent to a medical panel.
Permanent Total Disability
The Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability compensation must be ·
evaluated under the standard established by U.C.A. 34A-2-413(1) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act. Specifically, Sec. 413(1)(b) requires that the Petitioner prove-three
elements: 1) She has suffered significant impairment as a result of the work accident; 2)
She is permanently and totally disabled, as defined by subsection 413(1)(c); and 3) Her .
work accident is the direct cause of the permanent total disability. These requirements are
discussed below.
1.

Significant Impairment

A "significant impairment or combination of impairments" under Utah Cod~§
34A-2-413(1)(b)(i) must be as the result of the industrial accident. In DeMille v. Thurston
Cable Construction. Case No. 00-1059 (5/30/03); 2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 87, the
Commission defined this as "a purely medical condition refl ecting any anatomical or
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function abnormality or loss." A significant impairment does not have to be demonstrated
by an impairment rating. Crafts v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 235 (Utah Ct. App.
2005).
The Petitioner's thoracic spine is fused from T7-T12. She is now limited to lifting 20
pounds and must avoid any repetitive flexion or extension of her thoracic spine. The
Petitioner's thoracic spine condition has been rated at 22% whole person, of which 12% is
due to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The ALJ concludes the Petitioner has a
significant impairment.
2.

Permanent Total Disability

Subsection 413(1)(b)(ii) requiest that the Petitioner prove she is permanently
totally disabled according to the four-part definition set out in subsection 413(1)(c)(i)
through (iv). Each of the four components of 413(1)(c) are summarized and discussed
below.
·.
Gainful employment
Subsection 413 (1) (c) (i) requires a finding that "the employee is not gainfully
employed." The Petitioner is not gainfully employed. The Petitioner returned to her job
and attempted to work for about 1.5 months after her July 2008 surgery. The Petitioner
was unable to physically perform her job duties as a housekeeper for the respondent. The
Petitioner's last day worked was two months and 3 weeks prior to her September 7, 2010
surgery which would have been June 17, 2010.
Impairments that limit ability to perform basic work activities
The Commission views the term "basic work activities" as referring to common
activities shared in a wide variety of occupational settings, and notto the unique
requirements or a particular job. In this sense, the term includes ability to report for work
and remain there for a typical day, as well as the degree of flexibility, strength,
comprehension, and ability to communicate that is required by the broad range of modern
jobs. Thus, this factor should not be judged against either the most strenuous o·r the most
sedentary work, but instead, what may be taken as relatively common requirements in the
broad middle range of employment. Chad D. Parkinson v. Chatco, Inc., et al., Case No. 03 0501, Commission Decision issued October 31, 2005.
The ALJ concludes that the Petitioner has a limited ability to do basic work. The

Petitioner suffers from a 22% whole person impairment of her thoracic spine which limits
her ability to lift tnore than 20 pounds or to flex or extend her thoracic spine. The
Petitioner also has a very limited intellectual functioning. ·The Petitioner was not able to
complete high school even with the assistance of special education. The Petitioner has a

•
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limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. The Petitioner also suffers from
a developmental disability. The Petitioner received special education and dropped out of
high school in the 12th grade. 1 The Petitioner testified she suffers from dyslexia, which
causes her to read things upside down or backwards. The Petitioner also suffered from
chronic pain and depression prior to the industrial accident. The Petitioner was also born
with underdeveloped kidneys and now has only one kidney. The Petitioner had bilateral
upper extremity pain which has been surgically treated. She also suffers from migraines.
The combination of the Petitioner's physical and intellectual limitations limits her ability to
perform basic work activities.

Inability to perform essential functions of past work
Subsection 413(1)(c)(iii) requires that "the industrial ... impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident .... " This requirement
focuses only on work-related impairments and their effect on the Petitioner's ability to
perform her prior work.
The Petitioner has worked as a housekeeper in hospitals for about 20 years. The
Petitioner was required to lift 50-70 pounds, clean bathrooms, wash walls, clean furniture,
make and clean beds, sweep and mop floors and dust. Housekeeping in a hospital setting is
medium level physical demand work. The Petitioner's work restriction of no lifting over 20
pounds alone takes her out of this category of work. The Petitioner has no other work
experience. · The AL) concludes that the Petitioner's thoracic back condition resulting
from the May 16, 2007 industrial accident prevents her from performing the essential
functions of the basic work activities for which she was qualified to perform at the time of
industrial accident.

Ability to do other work
This final part of subsection 413(2)(c) requires the ALJ to consider whether the
Petitioner can do other work that is reasonably available to her, taking into account her
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional.capacity.

•

I Although not presented as an exhibit at the hearing, attached to the Petitioner's Application for Hearing is a
copy of the February 17, 2010 Notice of Attorney Advisor Decision-Fully Favorable which granted.the
Petitioner Social Security Disability benefits on the basis of her thoracic spine condition and borderline
intellectual functioning. Although Respondents object to the consideration of this piece of evidence because it
was not offered nor adm itted at the hearing. it was nonetheless an attachment to a pleading and therefore
already part of the evidentiary record. This decision notes that psychological testing conducted as part of the
Social Security evaluation revealed below average intellectual functioning, including a full scale intelligence
quotient score of only 70. This evidence must be addressed in any subsequent proceedings related to reemployment.
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The Petitioner is 39 years old and dropped out of high school in 12 th grade. The
Petitioner was in special education classes in high school and suffers from a learning
disability. The Petitioner's work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result of
the May 16, 2007 accident, she is restricted to lifting no more than 20 pounds and must
avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine. The Petitioner also has
limited intellectual abilities. The Petitioner's work history is unskilled labor. As a result,
she does not possess any transferable work skills.
Mike Hyatt, the respondents' vocational expert, believes the Petitioner can perform
work as a hotel/motel housekeeper because it meets the light category of work which is the
category of work that does not require lifting over 20 pounds.
Working as a hotel/motel housekeeper would require the Petitioner to change
linens, strip and make beds, vacuum, clean bathrooms, empty garbage cans and dust.
Stripping a bed requires the blanket and cover to be pulled off and the sheets and pillow
cases removed. Common sense indicates the following activities also require bending or
exertion at the thoracic level: 1) Cleaning bathrooms, including mopping floors, cleaning
sinks and counter at waist level; 2) Cleaning over sink mirrors, reaching upward and
forward; 3) Cleaning tub/shower combinations (included in most hotel rooms) that
requires reaching and bending with the upper body to clean; 4) Cleaning a toilet; 5)
Vacuuming carpet with movement of arm and torso.

A hotel/motel housekeeper is required to clean many rooms a day at a quick pace. It
is clear that the majority of tasks a hotel/motel housekeeper performs require repetitive
extension and flexion of the thoracic spine. The ALJ concludes that the job of hoteljmotel
housekeeper would require the Petitioner to engage in repetitive flexion and extension of
her thoracic spine and exceeds her medical restrictions resulting from the May 16, 2007
industrial accident.
Paul Barnes, the respondent's vocational expert, believes the Petitioner can perform
a job at Avalon Health Care, an assisted living home for veterans, as a housekeeper. Mr.
Barnes did not know the specific job tasks other than having past experience and being
able to read, write and follow oral and written directions. Common sense indicates that an
assisted living home would have bedrooms and bathrooms where the residents live that a
housekeeper would clean, and that the housekeeping tasks would be the same or similar to
that of a hotel/motel housekeeper. Based upon the above findings related to hotel/motel
housekeeping, a housekeeper in an-assisted living home would require repetitive flexion
and extension of the Petitioner's thoracic spine and exceed her work restricdons as the
result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident.
Mr. Barne_s also opined that the Petidoner could engage in light assembly work
assembling light medical plastics and that job openings exist Optima Consulting and Integra
Life Sciences. Critically, Mr. Barnes and Mr. Hyatt were not aware of the specific job

•
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requirements for these jobs and was unable to provide any details as to t he physical
requirements of these jobs other than meeting the Petitioner's lifting weight limitation. In
identifying light housekeeping and light assembly work as other work the Petitioner could
perform, Mr. Hyatt agreed that bending and reaching is not a lways noted in the Dictionary
of Occu pational Titles, which formed the basis of his opinion. Common sense indicates that
genera lly m ost assembly work requires rapid reaching and bending of the upper back to
assemble pa rts, either seated or standing at a work station tabl e or an assembly line.
Neither Mr. Barnes nor Mr. Hyatt described the jobs they ident ified as not having this
requirement.
The ALJ concl udes that the other work ide ntified by the Respondents does not meet
the Petitioner's work limitation of havi ng to avoid a ny repetitive flexion and extension of
her thoracic s pine. The ALJ therefore concludes that t he Petitioner cannot perform other
work reasonably available, taking into consideration he r age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity.
3.

Work accident as "direct cause" of disability

The Petitioner has very limited intellectual abilities and her wor k history is
dominated·by one task: cleaning. Although the Petitioner suffer ed from many conditions,
including depression, chronic pain, including neck and back pain, migraines, incontinence,
upper extremity pain and other aiJm·ents, she continued to do her work as a hospital
housekeeper, classified as medium level physical demand work, until the May 1 6, 2007
industrial accident. The Petitioner also tried to return to her work as a housekeeper
following treatment for her injuries as the result of this accident but was not successful due
to her physical limitations following the thoracic fusion s urgery. The Petitioner did not
have physical restrictions that prevented her from performing her job duties until the May
16, 2007 industrial accident. The ALJ concludes the Petitioner's January 26, 2007
industrial injury is direct cause of the Petitioner's permanent total disability
Summary
The Petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the May
16, 2007 industrial accident beginning June 18; 2010, when the Petitioner was no longer
able to work because of her thoracic spine condition.
Medical Expenses
The Petitioner is entitled to payment o f medical expenses related to her September
7, 2010 thoracic s urgery to repair the non-union from t he prior surgery. There is no
dispute that the Petitioner suffered a non-union. Both Dr. Patel and Dr. Newton agree on
this point. Although Dr. Newton opined that it was not "an. urgency" he has not opined the
s urgery was not necessary to t reat this condition.
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•

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman
Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, pay the Petitioner subsistence benefits
at the rate of $282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order
of the Commission. Those amounts accrued to date are due and payable in a lump sum p lus
interest at the rate of 8% per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys' fees shall be paid directly to
Daniel F. Bertch, according to Utah Code§ 34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule
602-2-4. That amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to Mr.
Bertch's office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents University of Utah Huntsman
Cancer Hospital and Workers' Compensation Fund, pay the Petitioner for necessary
medical treatment incurred to treat her thoracic spine condition as the result of the
industrial accident, including, but not limited to, the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant
to the Commission RB RVS fee schedule, plus interest at the rate of8% per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents University of Utah Huntsman
Cancer Hospital and Workers' Compensation Fund notify the Commission in writin_g within
45 days ofthe date of this order whether a re-employment plan shall be submitted. )f the
respondents elect to submit a re-employment plan within 45 days of the date of this order,
the re-employment plan shall be submitted to the Commission within 90 days of the date of
this order.

? I W-

DATED this _ __ day of January, 2014

~

Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth
the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from
the -date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the
Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for

•
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Review or its response. If none of the parties specifically request r eview by the Appeals
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commiss ioner.

•
Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers
Compensation Fund C:1se No. 10-0208
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER UPON REMAND was mailed on January 31, 2014, to
the persons/parties at the following addresses:

Rashell Quast
c/o Daniel F Bertch Esq
dan@bertchrobson.com
Workers Compensation Fund
designated_agent@wcfgroup.com
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital
c/o Hans Scheffler Esq
hscheffl@wcfgroup.com
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Daniel F Bertch Esq
dan@bertchrobson.com
Hans Scheffler Esq
hscheffl@wcfgroup.com
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Clerk
Adjudication Division

ADDENDUM "C"
Order of The Utah Labor Commission, June 2, 2014 .

•

- - - - ·-- -- -- - - - - - - - - -

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
RASHELL QUAST,
Petitioner,

•

vs.

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HUNTSMAN
- C:ANGER-H0SP1-T-A:b-and-W0RlfERS COMPENSATION FUND,

--- Case-No.--1-0-0208----------

Respondents.

University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and its insurance carrier, Workers
Compensation Fund, (collectively referred to as "Huntsman") ask the Utah Labor Commission to
review Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's preliminary award of permanent total disability
compensation to Rashell Quast under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Utah Code_Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63G4-301 of the Utah Ad.rniJpstrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(4) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Ms. Quast sustained a thoracic-spine injury on May 16, 2007, while she was working for
Huntsman. Ms. Quast originally filed a claim for benefits in 2008, case number 08-0988, but the ·
parties resolved that claim by way of a stipulation. Specifically, the parties stipulated that Ms. Quast
had a pre-existing thoracic-spine injury that was permanently aggravated by the work accident and
that Huntsrpan was responsible for the cost of surgery in July 2008 to treat the injury.
Ms. Quast then filed another claim for permanent total disability compensation and medical
benefits related to the 2007 work accident, which is the subject of the ctment dispute. .She
- · ·underwent aad1t1onal surgery m Sepfember 2010-to acldress a nonumon ftbrrrth-e--2008··surgery;·but- ... · ... her. work restrictions and impairment rating were not clearly addressed. Judge Hann held an
evidentiary hearing and awarded benefits :to Ms. Quast including an award of permanent total
disability compensation. Huntsman appealed the award to the Appeals Board, which found that
further medical _evidence was necessary to determine Ms. Quast's entitlement to benefits and
remanded the matter.
.

.

On remand, Judge Hann held another evidentiary hearing and took additional medical
evidence on Ms. Quast's condition. The matter was then reassigned to Judge Marlowe, who
reviewed the evidence and concluded that Ms. Quast was entitled to the cost of the 2010 surgery and

--~----·--·----··-· - - - - - - - -

-------- - - - - · - - - - - - - ---------- -
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a preliminary award of permanent total disability compensation subject to Huntsman's right to
submit a reemployment plan. Huntsman now seeks review of Judge Marlowe's decision by arguing
that there are conflicting medical opinions with regard to the necessity of the 2010 surgery and Ms.
Quast's work restrictions such that referral to an impartial medical panel is necessary. Huntsman
also submits that Ms. Quast has not established entitlement to perrpanent total disability
comgensation.
·-·· -··-•---- -- -···- ·- ·· · ····- ··- -•· ·· ··-· ··· ··-··· ···-•·•-- - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- -

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds the following facts to be material to Huntsman's motion for review.
Ms. Quast was born in 1971. She has a learning disability and dropped out of high school iii the 12th
grade. Ms. Quast's employment background consists of working as a hospital housekeeper, where
she was required occasional heavy lifting, cleaning bathrooms, taking out the trash, washing walls
· and floors, making beds, cleaning furniture, and dusting. She has a history ofurological problems in
addition to migraines and chronic back pain. Ms. Quast has suffered vario"9s work injuries over the
years and has been assessed with different work restrictions as a result; however, there fs no
indication that she had permanent restrictions as a result of such injuries.
. On May 16, 2007, Ms. Quast was working for Huntsman when she slipped on a wet floor and
fell to the ground. She underwent decompression and fusion surgery on her thoracic spine performed
by Dr. Patel in July 2008. As noted above, the parties entered into a stipulation that Ms. Quast
sustained an "injury by accident while in the course and scope ofher employment with [Huntsman]."
The parties further agreed that the accident "permanently aggravated [Ms. Quast's] pre-existing
thoracic condition" and that the 2008 surgery was necessary due to the accident. After she was
released to return to work, Ms. Quast worked for about a month before resigning.

Ms. Quast's mid-back pain persisted after the surgery. Dr: Poppen opined in August 2009
that Ms. Quast was "100% disabled" from all of lq.er conditions. In December 2009, Dr. Poppen
assessed Ms. Qtiast<V,1ith a: thor_acic disc-herniation andmyelopathy thatrequir~d surg~i:y: ' Dr._ Popp.e.n,~.-."""::. ..: ...,...
also found that increased pain medication- beyond what Ms. Quast was pr~scribed before the
accident- was necessary due to the 2007 work injury. In early 2010, Dr.':Wold evaluated Ms. Quast
and.re.commended physic.a l th!;!rapy ap._d_gill_Lt.r.aj_n_ipg f..o_r_J:i~r tb,Qrn~jc-:spiP,e cqndition.
·
···-· .. ·- .. ··-··· · ---- ·· - .
Ms. Quast followed up with Dr. Patel, who ordered a CT scan to diagnose her continued 1:fack
pain. Dr. Patel diagnosed Ms. Quast with a nonunion in her thoracic spine at the Tl 1 level and
unstable hardware installed during the 2008 surgery. Ms. Quast underwent a functional capacity
. evaluation in August 2010, where she demonstrated the ability to lift twenty pounds and to work in
the light physical demand category of jobs. She showed limited range of motion in her thoracic
spine, but full functional range of motion throughout her entire spine and she tolerated repetitive
forward reaching as well.

p
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In early September 2010, Huntsman's medical consultant, Dr. Newton, acknowledged tl1e
possibility of redoing the fusion at Tl 0- 11, but opined that such treatment was not urgent. Dr.
Newton added that Ms. Quast's limitations were largely self-imposed, but that she should not lift
more than 20 pounds and should avoid repetitive flexion or extension of her spine due to the 2007
work injury. Dr. Newton also found that neither medication nor assistive devices were necessary to
treat Ms. Quast' s work injury. Dr.. Patel performed_a surgi~al revision later in Se2tember 2010 and
confumed the nonunion and failed hardware diagnosis postoperatively.
Following the 2010 surgery, Dr. Lawrence, who took over for Dr. Patel, opined that Ms.
Quast showed significant improvement since the last surgery and was doing well overall despite her
complaints of continued back pain. Ms. Quast underwent another functional capacity evaluation in
2012 administered by Ms. Marchant, who concluded that Ms. Quast could lift 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and still demonstrated the capacity for light work. Ms.
Marchant also found that Ms. Quast again demonstrated limited motion of her spine, but was then
observed exceeding measured motion during the functional tasks. Ms. Marchant noted that Ms.
Quast did not give a consistently credible effort during the evaluation and exhibited signs of
symptom magnification.
Another of Huntsman's medical consultants, Dr. Mattingly, evaluated Ms. Quast in April
2012. Dr. Mattingly opined that neither the 2008 surgery nor the 2010 revision were medically
caused by the 2007 work accident because Ms. Quast sustained only a temporary aggravation ofher
pre-existing back condition from the accident. Dr. Mattingly assessed Ms. Quast with chronic back
pain, generalized anxiety, depression and opiate dependency. Dr. Mattingly recognized that Ms.
Quast' s ability to work was constrained by her heavy use of pain medication, but concluded Ms.
Quast did not have any work restrictions due to the 2007 accident. Dr. Mattingly added that
reasonable work restrictions based on Ms. Quast' s pre-existing conditions would be no lifting more
than 20 pounds, limit bending, and alternate between sitting, standing and walking as needed.
Ms.-Quast 'te'sti:fied 'that she has-not attempted to find wqrk since the 2008 surgery. Buntsman...a. • .._:••_.;.,presented the testimony oftwo different vocational rehabilitation experts, Mr. Hiatt and Mr. Barnes,
who testified that Ms. Quast could return to work as a housekeeper at a hotel or an assisted living
... - ..facility based.on.her..lifting restriction._Neither Mr._B.arnes. nor.Mr. Hiatt could state.whether.s~ch. . . .. _ . . . . ...
positions required repetitive bending or reaching.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Huntsman raises two main issues in its motion for review: 1) whether it is necessary to refer
certain aspects of Ms. Quast's claim to an impartial medical panel; and 2) whether Ms. Quast has
established entitlement to permanent total disability compensation. The Commission addresses these
issues as follows.

•
i
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I.

f
I

Medical Panel Referral

Huntsman contends that there are differing medical opinions with regard to the medical cause
of the 2010 surgery, future medical treatment due to the 2007 work accident, and Ms. Quast's work
restrictions such that referral to a medical panel is required. The Commission's rule R602-2-2(A)
______:grovides that "[a] panel 'Y_iJ.IJ?..~_!!m!~-~~!..!:Y!here one or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally, a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant medical issues are involved when there are:
1) conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury;
2) conflicting medical opinions ofpermanent physical impairment which vary more
than 5% of the whole person;
3) conflicting medical opini0ns as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary
more than 90 days;
4) conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability; or
5) medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000."

Necessity ofthe 2010 Surgery
The parties stipulated that the 2007 . accident permanently aggravated Ms. Quast' s preexisting thoracic-spine condition and that the 2008 .surgery was due to the work-related injury. The
medical evidence shows that the 2010 surgery was to revise the 2008 procedure, the necessity for
which was confirmed postoperatively by Dr. Patel. Dr. Newton noted the possibility of a surgical
revision and, though he did not believe it to be urgent, did not clearly dispute the necessity of the
2010 surgical revision. Dr. Poppen also described that Ms. Quast required thoracic-spine surgery
even after the first procedure had been done.
Dr. Mattingly opined after the fact that neither the 2008 nor the 2010 surgeries were
-- - - ~ ~_-.., - -- necessary-to:·treat-Ms:-Quast1-s-w0rk-injury-:-Ho:we:v.er,t>r-.- MattiI;lgly-~s-opirrion-was-based: on-fue ·=--,.... :::=-;;-.=-. conclusion that the accident resulted in only a temporary .bac:;k injury rather than the permanent
aggravation to which the parties had already stipulated. Based on the medical evidence provided, the
. . ... _. .. .. _ . Commission concludes_that th~_20l 0. sµ:rg~ry_w~_q_aus;:t]Jy _cpnp.~gt~q to :t.he 2008'.procedure: .Wb.f:n
considering that the parties had already stipulated that the 2008 surgery was related to the work
accident, Dr. Mattingly's reasoning on the issue is inapposite and there is no remaining conflict of
medical opinions that would warrant referral to a medical panel.

Necessity ofFuture Medical Care
There are differing medical opinions regarding future medical care necessary to treat Ms.
Quast's work-related thoracic-spine injury; however, such conflicting opinions do not require the
utilization of a medical panel under the rule. Additionally, there is no indication that the medication,
assistive device, or physical therapy expenses which constitute the different recommended treatments

i
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amount to more than $10,000 such that a medical panel must be utilized according to rule.
Dr. Newton found that no further medical care was necessary due to the accident, while Dr.
Poppen and Dr. Wold had varying recommendations for future ·care. After reviewing the various
medical opinions on the issue, the Commission is persuaded by Dr. Newton's opinion as it presented
__-1!.Jnore thorough evaluation ofMs.__Quast's condition and explanation as to why no medications or
assistive devices were necessary on an industrial basis. Based on the evidence provided, the
Commission finds that no future medical care is necessary to treat Ms. Quast's thoracic-spine injury.

- - · - - - · -··-- - -

Work Restrictions
The last issue that Huntsman argues may require consideration by a medical panel pertains to
Ms. Quast's work restrictions. The Appeals Board previously remanded this m_atter for a better
determination of Ms. Quast' s work restrictions following the 2010 surgery. The only evidence that
clearly addresses Ms. Quast's post-surgery restrictions comes from Dr. Mattingly's evaluation in
April 2012. 1 Although Dr. Mattingly opined that Ms. Quast has no restrictions from the work
accident, that opinion appears to stem from Dr. Mattingly's conclusion that the work accident
resulted in only a temporary injury. Because it has been established that Ms. Quast sustained a
permanent thoracic-spine injury from the 2007 accident, Dr. Mattingly's opinion regarding work
restrictions, like her opinion on the necessity of the 2010 surgery, is not convincing.
Ms. Quast chose not to supplement the record with evidence related to her work restrictions
after the Appeals Board found additional evidence to be necessary. The combination ofMs. Quast's
functional capacity evaluation results and Dr. Lawrence's opinion regarding her improvement after
the 2010 surgery shows that Ms. Quast is even less limited than Dr. Newton found. Dr. Newton
appeared to restrict repetitive flexion or extension ofthe spine based on the type of surgery that Ms.
Quast' s underwent; however, she was observed to have full functional range of motion in her spine
and to be able to reach without significant difficulty. The Commission finds that the work accident
.- .. · - - · · ~ ·reswted-inTestrietians of no·lifting-more.than .Z-0 .pi:nmcls· and-no ·i:epetiti:ve-bending ofthe. spine,-.ouh9-~:;:;.;-:.::-.:.' that repetitive reaching is permissible. The Commission concludes that referral to a medical panel is
not required to determine Ms. Quast's work restrictions or the other medical aspects of her claim.
·--··--· -··--- · · -·- ···-- --·-·-·-·• -·-··--- · ··-···· ·· ····-- - ·-··- •·- --·- ·-···-··-···· · -·-- • -· · - · · · · ·

II.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation

---- -- - ···---

-········ .

··· ··- -- - . . .

Section 34A-2-413 (1 )(b) ofthe Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that, in order to
establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, an injured employee must show:
(i)
1

The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination ofimpairments as

Dr. Knippa also performed a psychological evaluation ofMs. Quast following the 2010 surgery, but
such evaluation did not address Ms. Quast' s work re~trictions except to find that her psychological
condition and drug use limited her to performing unskilled labor.

·· · - ·--·
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a result of the industrial accident. .. that gives rise to the permanent total disability
entitlement;
(ii) The employee is permanently and totally disabled; and
(iii) The industrial accident ... is the direct cause of the employee's permanent total
disability.
.. . .... ... --·- ·-··--

•

- -- - -- - - -- - -- - -- - - -

-- -- j

Significant Impairment
Huntsman argues that M s. Quast did not sustain a significant impairment from the 2007
accident essentially because she retains much of the same functional ability she ·had before ·the
accident. The evidence shows that the work accident resulted in a thoracic-spine impairment that
limits Ms. Quast from lifting more than 20 pounds and from repetitive bending ofthe spine. Nearly
all of Ms. Quast's past work involved housekeeping tasks in a hospital setting, at least some of
which she can no longer perform because of her impaired lifting ability. The medical evidence
shows that Ms. Quast does retain most of her functional ·ability from before the accident; but her
work-related spine impairment impacts her ability to do at least some of the work she has done for
her entire career. The Commission therefore concludes that Ms. Quast's work-related spine
impairment is significant. Ms. Quast has met §413(l)(b)(i).

r

Permanent Total Disability
Subsection 34A-2-413(1)(b)(ii) requires Ms. Quast to demonstrate that she is permanently
and totally disabled according to the requirements of§34A-2-413(1)(c). It is Ms. Quast' s burden to
prove each of the following:

I'

(i)
·(ii)

-

~

.-·

The employee is not gainfully employed;
The employee has· ail impairment or combination of impairments .that limit the·
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
- -- -·-: - -;- .- . · . ·· (iii)- -The-industrial impairment or occupationally caused impairment-or combination of -impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the
work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the
. . .... .. .industrial accident . .. thaUs.the .basis for the.employee.' s permanent total disabjlitr. . _ .. _ _. . ...
cl~m;and
i
(iv) The employee cannot perform· other work reasonably" available, taking into
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical
capacity, and residual functional capacity.
.
7 .. ·•••

Ms. Quast is not gainfully employed. With respect to the next element, §413(1)(c)(ii), the
Commissi_o n has consistently interpreted the term "basic work activities" as common factors
generally_required in a wide variety of employment settings. These factors include the_ability to
report for work on a regular basis and remain at work through the day, as well as a reasonable degree
of flexibility, strength, endurance, mental capacity and ability to communicate. The impairment in

•• - ~-~• • •. •.:::._--:·..:: - · ·
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question need not be related to the work accident. Ms. Quast suffers from various conditions that
affect her ability to function, including a learning disorder, urological problems, migraines, and
thoracic-spine problems. However, she was able to work for many years with her pre-existing
conditions, which leads the Commission to conclude that such conditions do not reasonably limit her
ability to do basic work activities. With respect to Ms. Quast's thoracic-spine condition, the results
_______ of the functional_capacity evaluation are particularly helpful. During the first evaluations, Ms. Quast
tolerated repetitive reaching and demonstrated full functional range of motion in her entire spine.
Since that evaluation, Dr. Lawrence, noted "significant improvement'' in Ms. Quast' s condition after
the revision-surgery. Ms. Quast's ability to lift 20 pounds and her difficulty only with repetitive
bending of her spine show that she still has a reasonable· degree of strength and flexibility. · The
record also shows Ms. Quast can work in the light physical demand category ofjobs, and there is no
indication of any limitation in her ability to communicate, report for work, or remain at work through
the day. Based on the evidence presented, the Commission finds Ms. Quast has not shown that her
impairments limit her ability to do basic work activities.
Although Ms. Quast has not met §413(1 )(c)(ii), the Commission will consider the remaining
elements of §413(1) in the interest of completeness. The next element requires Ms. Quast to show
that her work-related thoracic-spine problems prevent her from performing the essential functi,ons of
the work activities· for which she has been qualified until the 2007 work accident. As aiready
discussed, Ms. Quast' s work injury limits her ability to lift heavy objects and her duties as a hospital
housekeepenequired herto do some heavy lifting. There is no indication in the rec_ord as to how
often Ms. Quast's work as a hospital housekeeper required b·ending of her spine, but her impaired
lifting ability precludes her from returning to the work for which she was qualified until the time of
the accident. Ms. Quast meets §413(1)(c)(iii).
The final element of §413(l)(c) requires Ms. Quast to show that she cannot perform other
work reasonably available considering her age, education, past work experience, medical capacity,
and residual functional capacity. Ms. Quast returned to work for about a month after the 2008
-.•.··- .,.,_-_,..._- , - surgery;·but has-not attempted.to find another job since then, -The Commi~siop ;n_o_te~, bo\\lever., th?.,t ·-. _-.-.- _ :· ...
her treating physician, Dr. Poppen, found her to be "l 00% disabled," which explains why she would. ·· ·· · ·
not look for work. Ms. Quast is relatively young and has years of experience in housekeeping tasks,
... _ _____·- · but..a lso__hasJimited..int~U~.c~. ~<:!p~cj:ty _cµiq _~d~a#9.!L _ _ __ ______ ·-·· __ .. .. .. __ ___ .. . ___ . ..... . ___ ... _____ _... ____
The main reason why Ms. Quast claims to be unable to work is her thoracic-spine condition;
however, such condition leaves her with good functional capacity as she can still lift up to 20 pounds
and need only avoid repetitive bending of the spine. Huntsman's vocational rehabilitation experts
testified that Ms. Quast could perform the duties of a housekeeper at a hotel or an assisted living
facility. However, the experts' opinion was based primarily on Ms. Quast' s ability to lift 20 pounds
and did not sufficiently address her restriction against repetitive bending of the spine. Certainly
different housekeeping jobs entail different amounts of required bending and it may be that there
exists a housekeeping job that Ms. Quast can perform with her restrictions. However, the failure by
Huntsman's vocational experts to offer any information regarding such bending requirements leads
/

· - - - - - - --------·--···-- -
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the Commission to find that Huntsman did not meet its burden of showing that there is other work
reasonably available to Ms. Quast.
Direct Cause

__ ___________ As _Ms . . Q!!_~sL has not established that she is permanently and totally disabled, the
Commission cannot conclude that the 2007 work accident .was the direct cause of such disability.
While the record supports Ms. Quast' s assertion that she cannot return to work for Huntsman in the
same capacity as when the accident occurred, the ability to return to a previous position is not the
only criterion for establishing that thework accident directly caused an injured worker's disability.
Rather, Ms. Quast must show that she is permanently and totally unable to work because of the
accident directly. Ms. Quast injured her back and underwent surgery oD"her spine due to the work
accident, but she has not demonstrated that she is permanently and totally unable to work simply
because she cannot return to her previous job. The medical evidence.shows Ms. Quast retains a level
of functionality even after the surgery that allows her to work.
Should Ms. Quast' s work-related spine condition deteriorate.such that a significant change in
circumstances occurs, she may b e eligible for pemianent total disability compensation at some future
date. As the evidence stands now, however, Ms1 Quast has not shown that she is entitled to
permanent total disability compensation. The Commission therefore .disagrees with Judge
Marlowe'~ decision regarding permanent total disability and denies Ms. Quast's claim for such
compensation.
ORDER
The Commission sets aside the portion of Judge Marlowe's decision of January 31, 2014,
awarding-subsistence-benefits to Ms. Quast for her claim·ofpermanent total disability compensation
and denies her claim for such benefits. The Commission affllTils the remaining portions of Judge
Marlc?we' s .decision.
Dated this.£. day of May, 2014.

- ·-- -··---·-· •____. --·-·-···-· - --·--·-· -· -··. .. ·---····-·--·-· ----~-~-..•.i-Jii"
----- ·-r·/ -~-- . . -·--·.----.. -··----- . . . -.· · -· . . --· ·-s-h-err_1_·e-j{a-....
ayc...as-4--hi__- - - - - Utah Labor Commissioner

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS'ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days dfthe date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
__ ___ .. _reyi_e_w_with Jb_e 9.Q.lJrt,_ Any such petition for review must be received~ the ~9urt within 30 days of
the date of this order .
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW
RASHELL QUAST
PAGE 10 OF 10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order on Motion for Review in the matter of Rashell
Quast, Case No. 10-0208, was mailed first class postage prepaid thisJi:'day of May, 2014, to the
following:

- - - - --

Rashell Quast
3831 S Hummingbird
Salt Lake City UT 84123

I

- ---- ------------------- - ------ 1

I

University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital
2000 Circle of Hope
Salt Lake City UT 84112
Workers Compensation Fund
Dennis V. Lloyd Designated Agent
100 W Towne Ridge Pkwy
Sandy UT 84070
Daniel F. Bertch, Esq.
1996 E 6400 S Ste 100
Salt Lake City UT 84121
Hans Scheffler, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund Legal Dept
100 W Towne Ridge Pkwy
Sandy UT 84070

---- -------. --------·---- ------- -·· ~~:i!,,;3-··
Utah Labor Commission

ADDENDUM "E"
20 C.F.R. 404.1520.

§ 404. 1521. What we mean by an impairment(s) that is not severe.

Code Of Federal Regulations
Title 20. Employees' Benefits
Chapter Ill. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Part 404. FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950-)
Subpart P. DETERMINING DISABILITY AND BLINDNESS
EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

Current through August 31, 2013
§ 404.1521 . What we mean by an impairment(s) that is not severe

(a)

Non-severe impairment(s). An impairment or combi nation of impairments is not severe if it
does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

(b)

Basic work activities. When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include(1)

Physical functions such as walking, standing , sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling,
reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2)

Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

(3)

Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;

(4)

Use of judgme nt;

(5)

Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations;
and

(6)

Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

Cite as 20 CFR 404.1521

History. 50 FR 8728, Mar. 5, 1985

ADDENDUM "D"
SSR85-28.
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Social Security
Official Social Security Website

Disability Insurance
(PPS-122)
SSR 85-28

SSR 85-28: TITLES II AND XVI: MEDICAL
IMPAIRMENTS THAT ARE NOT SEVERE
PURPOSE: To clarify the policy for determining when a person's impairment(s) may be found "not severe"

and, thus, the basis for a finding of "not disabled" in the sequential 'evaluation of disability, and thereby
reflect certain circuit court decisions that have taken ·issue with the Secretary's previously stated definition
of "not severe" impairments.
CITATIONS (AUTHORITY): Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, as

amended; Regulations No. 4, sections 404:1520-404.1523 and Regulations No. 16, sections 416.920416.923.
PERTINENT HISTORY: Th_e basic definiti,on of disability is contained in sections 223(d)(1)(A) and 1514(a)

(3)(A) of the Act. Under this definition, an individual must have, as an initial requirement, a "physical or
mental impairment," as defined in sections 223.(d)(3)" and 1614(a)(3)(C), and which is expected either to
result in death or to last at least 12 months. The principal requirement regarding impairment severity
contained in the·basic statutory definition of disability is that the individual's inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity (SGA) be "by reason of' the impairment.
In reporting on the .Social ?ecurity Amendments of 1954 which first introduced the basic definition of
disability into the Act, the Senate Committee on Finance indicated that the definition required that there
be a "medically determinable impairment of serious proportions," that is, "of a nature and degree of
severity sufficient to justify its consideration as the cause of failure to obtain any substantial gainful work."
In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress introd~ced. into the Act the provision in sectio,n
223(d)(2)(A) which sets out a specific requirement respecting impairment sev~rity and which provides for
the consideration of vocational factors in determining disability: An individual " ... shall be determined to
be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
http://www.socialsecurity.g ol60P_ Horre/ruling s/di/01/SSR85-26-di-01.htm
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experience, engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ... "
(emphasis added). In reporting on these amendments, both the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Ways and Means reaffirmed the need for some assurance that a finding of disability
would be based on a serious impairment. The Committees explained that the provisions of the
amendment would require, in part, that:
"... an individual would be disabled only if it is shown that he has a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment or impairments . .. " (emphasis added).
As in '1954 and 1967,.Congress, again, in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984,
made it clear that a denial of disability benefits may be based on medical factors alone. In amending
section 223(d)(2) and section 1614(a)(3) of the Act to provide for the evaluation of the impact of multiple
impairments throughout the sequential evaluation process, Congress introduced language which affirms
the presence of a severity threshold in the adjudicative process:
"In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a
sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under
this section, the Secretary shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments .. ·

The validity of a disability de_cision based on medical considerations alone was also recognized in the
Conferees' discussion of the amendment (House of Representatives Conference Report 98-1039 to
accompany H.R. 3755. September 19, 1984, p. 30) in which it was stated that there was no intention to
"either eliminate or impair" the use of the "current sequential evaiuation process."
The principal that a denial determination may be made on the basis of medical considerations alone was
first reflected in Regulations No. 4, section 404.1502(a), published in 1960. Regulations published in

.

1978 revised the 1960 st~tement concerning such determinations by replacing the phrase "... the only
impairment is a slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormali_ty or
combination of slight abnormalities .. ." with "... the medically determinable impairment is not severe if it
does not significantly limit an individual's physical or mental capacity to perform basic work-related
functions."
This change in regulatory definition was introduced in the language describing step 2 of the sequential
evaluation process which was formalized in regulations effective February 26, 1979. (The 1980
recodification of the Disability Regulations into common sense language reworded the definition of a riot
severe impairment as follows: "An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or
mental abilities to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. 404.1521(a) and 416.921(a). Also see sections
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).) These changes in regulatory language were not intended to alter the levels
of severity for a finding of not disabled on the basis of medical considerations alone. Rather, they were
http://www.social security.go\b'O P_H orre/rulings/di/01/SSR85-28-di-01.htni
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intended only to clarify the circumstances under which such a finding would be justified (Federal Register
-- March 7, 1978, p. 9296-9297; November 28, 1978, p. 55357-55358). Nevertheless, some recent circuit
court decisions have taken exception to the threshold of impairment severity applied in the adjudication of
subject cases which were denied on the basis of not severe impairment.
As observed by the Congress, the Social Security Administration (SSA), as part of an ongoing review, is
reevaluating the application of the not severe impairment policy and will continue to do so. This ruling is
part of the ongoing reevaluation and interprets and clarifies the current policy on not severe impairment,
describes the threshold intended, and reflects recent legislation. Also, it is being issued to clarify that
SSA's policy is consistent with various court decisions. For example, Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th
Cir. 1985), and Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340 (5th Circ. 1984), stated that "an impairment can be
considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual
that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work irrespective of age, education,
or work experience." As Baeder v. Heckler, No. 84-5663 (3rd Cir. July 24, 1985), suggested, the severity
regulation is to do no "more than allow the Secretary to deny benefits summarily to those applicants with
impairments of a minimal nature which could never prevent a person from working."
POLICY CLARIFICATION: In determining, for initial entitlement to benefits, whether an individual is

disabled, we follow a sequential evaluation process whereby current work activity, severity and duration of
impairment, ability to do past work, and ability to do other work (in light of the individual's age, education
and work experience) are considered, in that order. See 20 CFR sections 404.1520 and 416.920. In
determining co'ntimiing entitlement to benefits, the adjudicator, with appropriate consideration of the
medical improvement review standard, also follows a sequential evaluation process which includes the
"not severe impairment" concept. Fundamental to these processes is the statutory requirement that to be
found disabled, an individual must have a medically determinable impairment "of such severity" that it
precludes his or her engaging in any substantial gainful work.
As explained in 20 CFR, sections 404.1520, 404.1521, 416.920(c), and 416.921 , at the second step of
sequential evaluation it must be determined whether medical evidence establishes an impairment or
combination of impairments "of such severity" as to be the basis of a finding of inability to engage in any
SGA. An impairment or combination of impairments is found "not severe" and a finding of "not disabled" is
made at this step when medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight
abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work even if the
individual's age, education, or work experience were specifically considered (i.e., the person's
impair-ment(s) has no more than a minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to perform
basic work activities). Thus, even if an individual were of advanced age, had minimal education, and a
limited work experience, an impairment found to be not severe would not prevent him or her from
engaging in SGA.

htlpJ/www.social security.g o'A'O P_ Home/ruling s/di/01/SSR85-28-di-01.htrrl
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The severity requirement cannot be satisfied when medical evidence shows that the person has the ability
to perform basic work activities, as required in most jobs. Examples of these are walking, standing, sitting,
lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding,
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment, responding appropriately to
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Thus, these basic work factors are inherent in making a determination that an individual does not have a
severe medical impairment.
Although an impairment is not severe if it has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's physical or
mental ability(ies) to do basic work activities, the possibility of several such impairments combining to
produce a severe impairment must be considered. Under 20 CFR, sections 404.1523 and 416.923, when
assessing the severity of whatever impairments an individual may have, the adjudicator must assess the
impact of the combination of those impairments on the person's ability to function, rather than assess
separately the contribution of each impairment existed alone. A claim may be denied at step two only if
the evidence sho\NS that the individual's impairments, when considered in combination, are not medically
severe, i.e., do not have more than a minimal effect on the person's physical or mental ability(ies) to
perform basic work activities. If such a finding is not clearly established by medical evidence, however,
;. r.

adjudication must continue through the sequential evaluation process.
Inherent in a finding of a medically not severe impairment or combination of impairments is the conclusion
that the individual's ability to engage in SGA is not serious affected. Before this conclusion can be
reached, however, an evaluation of the effects of the impairment(s) on the person's ability to do basic
work activities must be made. A determination that an impairment(s) is not severe requires a careful
evaluation of the medical findings which describe the impairment(s) and an informed judgment about its

8

(their) limiting effects on the individual's physical and mental ability(ies) to perform basic work activities;
thus, an assessment of function is inherent in the medial evaluation process itself. At the second step of
sequential evaluation, then, medical evidence alone is evaluated in order to assess the effects of the
impairment(s) on ability to do basic work activities. If this assessment shows the individual to have the
physical and mental ability(ies) necessary to perform such activities, no evaluation of past work (or of
age, education, work experience) is needed. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the minimal
impact of the impairment(s), that the individual is capable of engaging in SGA.
By definition, basic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. In the
absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that an individual whose impairments do not
preclude the performance of basic work activities is, therefore, able to perform his, or her past relevant
work. If the medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality(ies) which has no more than a minimal
effect on a claimant's ability to do basic work activities, but evidence shows that the person cannot
perform his or her past relevant work because of th e unique features of that work, a denial at the "not
severe" step of the sequential evaluation process is inappropriate. The inability to perform past relevant
http://www.socialsecurity.g o\A'OP_Horre/ruling s/di/01/SSR85-28--di-01.htrrl
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work in such instances warrants further evaluation of the individual's ability to do other work considering
age, education and work experience.[ 11
Great care should be exercised in applying the not severe impairment concept. If an adjudicator is unable
to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the individual's ability to
do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation process should not end with the not severe evaluation
step. Rather, it should be continued . In such a circumstance, if the impairment does not meet or equal the
severity level of the relevant medical listing , sequential evaluation requires that the adjudicator evaluate
the individual's ability to do past work, or to do other work based on the consideration of age, education,
and prior work experience.
EFFECTIVE DATE: On publication.
CROSS-REFERENCES: Program Operations Manual System, sections DI 00401.390-DI 00401.41 O; DI

A00401 .390-DI A00401.410.
· -··· ···•
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provision does not conflict with, nor negate, the policy stated in SSR 82-63 concerning special "no

recent or relevant work experience" cases. In such cases a_
n individual must be found to have a severe
impairment(s) (i.e., one which has more than a minimal effect on the person's physical or mental
ability(ies) to perform basic work activities) in order to be considered under the special provision of that
Ruling.
·--·-·············-·-·····--··-·· - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatme nt

Certiorari Granted by

Quast v. Labor Com'n.

Utah,

December 11,

Workers' Compensation
{.= In general; questions of law or fact
Whether the Labor Commission applied
the correct legal standard in making its
determination is a question of law, and appellate
courts review the legal standard applied by
the Commission for correctness in workers'
compensation case.

2015

362 P.3d 292
Court of Appeals of Utah.

Rashell QUAST, Petitioner,
V.

LABOR COMMISSION, University of
Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital, and
Workers Compensation Fund, Respondents.

Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

No. 20140559-CA.

\¥orkers' Compensation
€;;;. Incapacity for Work or Employment
To satisfy the limited-ability element of a
pennanent total disability claim, the workers'
compensation claimant need not prove a
complete inability to perform basic work
activities, but only that the claimant's ability to
perform these activities is limited. West's U.C.A.
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c).

I
Nov. 12, 2015.
Synopsis
Background: Workers' compensation claimant sought
judicial review ofthe Labor Commission's denial of her claim
for pennanent total disability compensation.

1 Cases that cite this headnote
[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., held
that claimant established that she could not perform basic
work activities without some limitation, thus satisfying the
limited-ability requirement for permanent total disability
compensation.

[4)

When making permanent total disability
detennination, Labor Commission should have
focused on whether workers' compensation
claimant's disabilities negatively affected her
ability to perform the basic work activities
commonly required in employment and not on
whether her disabilities "reasonably" limited her
ability to perform basic work activities; claimant
needed only to establish that her ability to
perfonn basic work activities was limited, not
that her limitations were reasonable. 20 C.F.R. §
404.152l(b)(l); West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-413.

So ordered.

West Headnotes (6)

[1)

Workers' Compensation
<()a;, Amount and period of compensation
Appellate courts review the Labor Cormnission's
ultimate finding as to whether workers'
compensation claimant seeking permanent total
disability has a limited ability to perform basic
work activities deferentially, reversing only if
the finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(l)(c).
Cases that cite this headnote

Workers' Compensation
o.. Particular cases in general

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Workers' Compensation
oS= Particular cases in general
Workers' compensation claimant established that
she could not perfom1 basic work activities
without some limitation, thus satisfying the
limited-ability requirement for pennanent total
disability compensation; claimant's thoracic-
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spine injury limited her physical functions
involving lifting items over 20 pounds and
bending her spine, claimant's work-related spine
impainnent impacted her ability to do at least
some of the work she had done for her entire
career, and her impaired lifting ability precluded
claimant from returning to the work for which
she was qualified at the time of the accident. 20

ii 2 Quast was injured in 2007 while working at the University

C.F.R. § 404.152l(b)(l); West's U.C.A. § 34A2-4 L3( I)(c)(ii).

,i 3 Quast filed a claim for permanent total disability
(PTD) compensation related to her 2007 accident. After
an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (the
ALJ) awarded Quast PTD compensation. On review, the
Commission vacated that decision and ordered a new hearing
to take additional medical evidence related to Quast's work
restrictions. After the second hearing, the ALJ again awarded
Quast PTD compensation. On review, the Commission again
reversed the award of PTD compensation.

Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Workers' Compensation
~

Incapacity for Work or Employment

Workers' compensation claimant, seeking
pem1anent
total
disability,
need only
demonstrate that her ability to perform basic
work activities is limited, not that her limitations
are reasonable or complete. West's U.C.A. §
34A-2-413(1 )(c).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital when she slipped and
fell on a wet floor. At the time of the accident, she had a
preexisting back injury and other medical conditions. The
accident permanently aggravated her preexisting back injury,
and she underwent spine surgery in 2008 and in *294 2010.
Quast has not worked since shortly after her 2008 surgery.

,i 4 The Commission found that "Quast suffers from
various conditions that affect her ability to function."
The Commission also found that Quasrs thoracic-spine
impairment "limits [Q1jlj~tj from lifting more than 20
pounds and from repetitive bending of the spine." The
Commission nevertheless concluded that ~iiast had failed
to show that her impairments limit her ability to do basic
work activities. The Commission explained that Qu.!!~'s'
preexisting conditions "do not reasonably limit her ability

for Petitioner.

to do basic work activities" and that, in spite of the
physical limitations from her thoracic-spine impairments,
"she still has a reasonable degree of strength and flexibility."

Hans M. Scheffler, for Respondents University of Utah
Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation

The Commission therefore denied .(t~l!~.t!:J claim for PTD
compensation. ~ua~t petitioned this court for judicial review
of the Commission's decision.

*293 Daniel F. Bertch and Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City,

Fund.
Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this
Memorandum Decision, in which Judges J. FREDERIC
VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

•

Memorandum Decision
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

,i 1 Rashell QiJ,!!_st seeks judicial review of the Labor
Commission's denial of her claim for permanent total
disability compensation. We set aside the Commission's

[1)
[2] ,i 5 Q1ta§! argues that the Commission erred in
determining that she was not limited in performing basic work
activities. We review the Commission's "ultimate finding," as
to whether a claimant has a limited ability to perform basic
work activities, deferentially, reversing only if the finding is
not supported by substantial evidence. Provo City v. Labor
Comm'n, 2015 UT 32, ,i,i 12-13, 345 P.3d 1242. But whether
the Commission applied the correct legal standard in making
its determination is a question oflaw, and we review the legal
standard applied by the Commission for correctness. A & B
Mech. Contractors v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT App 230, ·,i
15,311P.3d528.

decision.

11 6 Quast argues that the Commission's finding that she was
not limited in her ability to perform basic work activities

WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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misinterprets the statutory language of Uiah Code section
34A-2-4 I 3. To demonstrate a pennanent total disability, a
claimant must demonstrate, among other things, that she has
"an impairment or combination of impairments that limit
the [claimaint's] ability to do basic work activities." Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1 )(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014).
Quast argues that "limit" in this context means only "that the
medical impairment places a limitation on work ability" and
that her thoracic-spine injury "has placed a significant limit
on her ability to do [basic work activities]"-i.e., bending and
lifting.
[3)

, 7 To satisfy the limited-ability element of a PTD claim,

the claimant "need not prove a complete inability to perform
basic work activities, [but] only that the [claimant's] ability to
perform these activities is limited." Provo City, 2015 UT 32,,
28, 345 P.3d 1242. Because "basic work activities" are those
" 'abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,' " the
claimant's impairments "must limit [the claimaint's) ability
to perform the work activities of a broad spectrum of jobs
available." Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (b) (2008)). In
Provo City, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Commission's
decision to award PTD compensation to a former facility
service technician because the evidence presented to the
Commission was sufficient to establish that the claimant's
impairments "negatively affect[ed] his ability to perform"
even in "more sedentary" and "less physically demanding
jobs, such as office work."
29-30. In other words, there
was substantial evidence from which the Commission could
find that the claimant's injury "limited his ability to perfonn
basic work activities that would be required for most jobs."

Id.,,

Id., 30.
, 8 Recently, this·court decided Oliver v. Labor Commission,
2015 UT App 225, wherein we explained the scope of the
inquiry required of the Commission in evaluating whether an
impairment limits a claimant's ability to perform basic work
activities:
[T]he Workers' Compensation Act. does not direct the
Commission to detennine whether the claimant has
reasonable levels of functionality or a reasonable ability
to *295 perform basic work activities. Rather, it requires
the Commission to consider whether a claimant's "ability
to perform these activities is limited." Thus, evaluating
whether a claimant retains a reasonable degree ofphysical
and mental functionality notwithstanding a disability has
no place in this analysis because the basic-work-activities
analysis begins and ends with evaluating whether the
claimant's disability "negatively affects" the ability to

perform the basic work activities commonly required in
employment.

Id. ~I 1 1 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14]
, 9 Our analysis in Oliver is dispositive here.
The Commission found that "Quast suffers from various
conditions that affect her ability to function" and that Quast's
thoracic-spine impainnent "limits [her] from lifting more
than 20 pounds and from repetitive bending of the spine."
Moreover, it found that Quast was limited to the "light
physical demand category of jobs." In accordance with
Oliver, the Commission should have focused only on whether
these disabilities "negatively affect[ ] [Q1,1ast's] ability to
perfonn the basic work activities commonly required in
employment." See id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.152l(b)(l) (2008) (giving
as examples of basic work activities "[p]hysical functions
such as ... lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or
handling"). There is no qualitative restriction before a finding
of"limited" can be made.
[SJ , IO The Commission's conclusion that ~ast~~ post2007 disabilities did not "reasonably" limit her ability to
perfonn basic work activities because she retained "good
functional capacity" are inconsistent with the statutory
language, our supreme court's guidance in Provo City, and
our recent decision in Oliver. !l.1!ill need only demonstrate
that her ability to perform basic work activities is limited,
not that such a limitation is "reasonable." See Provo City,
20 15 UT 32,, 28, 345 P.3d 1242; Oliver, 2015 UT App
225, , 11, 359 P.3d 684 (observing that the Commission's
use of the qualifying tenn "reasonable" imposed a higher
burden on the claimant than that dictated by statute and
that the Commission therefore misconstrued the governing
legal standard). The Commission's findings demonstrate that
Q•.f~st'$ thoracic-spine injury limits her physical functions
involving lifting items over twenty pounds and bending her
spine. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(l). And the findings
demonstrate that ~ i;[ii§~ "work-related spine impairment
impacts her ability to do at least some of the work she
has done for her entire career" and that "her impaired
lifting ability precludes [~!JJll"fj from returning to the work
for which she was qualified at the time of the accident."
Moreover, the Commission detennined that while there may
be some housekeeping work that Quas~ can perform despite
her restrictions against repetitive bending of the spine, her
employer failed to prove that there was other work reasonably
available to Q.ii~st.

-·
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16] ~ 11 To prove her entitlement to pennanent total
disability compensation, Quast need only establish that her
"ability to perform [basic work] activities is limited," not
that her limitations are "reasonable" or "complete." Here,
the evidence indicates that Quast cannot perfom1 basic work
activities without some limitation, thus satisfying the limitedability requirement for PTO compensation under section
34A- 2-4 l 3( 1)(c)(ii) of the Utah Code. The Commission's

End of Document

contrary determinations as to whether Quast was limited
in her ability to do basic work activities were based on
an incorrect legal standard. We therefore set aside the
Commission's ruling and allow the ALJ's order to stand.

All Citations
362 P.3d 292, 2015 UT App 267
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